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Deputizing Family: Loved Ones as a Regulatory Tool in the
“Drug War” and Beyond
Matthew B. Lawrence*1
Many laws use family members as a regulatory tool to influence the
decisions or behavior of their loved ones, i.e., they deputize family. Involuntary
treatment laws for substance use disorder are a clear example; such laws
empower family members to use information shared by their loved ones to
petition to force their loved ones into treatment without consent. Whether
such deputization is helpful or harmful for a patient’s health is a crucial and
dubious question discussed in existing literature, but use of family members as
a regulatory tool implicates important considerations beyond direct medical
impacts that have not been as fully explored. These include the potential for
interference with underlying family relationships, the invisibility of care
worker burdens, and the inequality of both the burdens and the benefits of care
work.
This Article shows how these difficult-to-quantify social consequences
of deputizing family can and should be incorporated into the evaluation of
laws that use loved ones as a tool of public health. It develops a normative
framework for doing so and demonstrates the usefulness of this framework
by applying it to the question of how and when patients may permit family
members to access and authorize disclosures of protected health information.
That analysis reveals the desirability of an “active choice” approach to such
deputization; as compared to an “isolation by default” approach, active choice
holds the promise to better and more fairly encourage, recognize, support,
facilitate, and perhaps even compensate the uniquely valuable care work by
loved ones that many who suffer from substance use disorder rely upon as a
crucial support in their battle with illness. Specific administrative changes to
effectuate that conclusion are recommended. Finally, the broader promise and
pitfalls of the Article’s “deputization” frame for understanding certain forms
of care work are also discussed.
*1
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I.

Introduction
The United States regulatory framework for preventing,
treating, and reducing the harms of substance use disorder (“SUD”)
increasingly relies upon loved ones of those who suffer from the
disease. In some cases the law explicitly and intentionally deputizes
family in addressing SUD; for example, “accessory” drug laws enlist
family in efforts at prevention-by-prohibition by making them liable
for involvement in their loved ones’ drug use.1 And involuntary
treatment laws enacted by numerous states and under consideration
in many others explicitly empower a person’s “physician, spouse,
blood relative, [or] guardian” to petition a court to have them sent
to treatment.2
In other cases, the SUD regulatory framework deputizes
family implicitly and perhaps unintentionally, though nonetheless
foreseeably. In many counties and states today, accessing treatment
for SUD entails days or weeks of phone calls and car trips looking
for open beds, especially for those hoping to have treatment covered
by insurance or Medicaid. In economics and ethics, this is referred
to as rationing by “ordeal”—rather than prices separating those
who receive the good from those who do not, a person’s ability to
complete an arduous task does so.3 When it comes to addiction,
the ordeal our regulatory framework puts between self-diagnosis of
1

2

3

See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding
conviction based on inference that one who owns and maintains a house knows
about drug and other illegal activities her son and other occupants engage in
inside the home); United States v. Johnson, 769 F. Supp. 389, 394 (D.D.C.
1991) (holding that “Johnson’s status as the lessee alone is a sufficient basis
upon which to find Ms. Johnson guilty of possession with intent to distribute”
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (2018)).
E.g., S. 391, Gen. Assemb., 2017−18 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017) (“A spouse, relative
or guardian of the respondent must file the [involuntary treatment] petition.”).
See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, § 35 (2018) (showing that a proceeding
may be initiated by a “police officer, physician, spouse, blood relative,
guardian, or court official”). See generally Involuntary Commitment for Individuals
with a Substance Use Disorder or Alcoholism, Nat’l Alliance for Model
State Drug Laws (Aug. 2016), http://www.namsdl.org/IssuesandEvents/
NEW%20Involuntary%20Commitment%20for%20Individuals%20with%20
a%20Substance%20Use%20Disorder%20or%20Alcoholism%20August%20
2016%2009092016.pdf.
See Benjamin A. Olken, Hassles Versus Prices: How Can Subsidized Health Products
Best Target Those Who Value Them?, 353 Science 864 (2016). See generally Vivi
Alatas et al., Ordeal Mechanisms in Targeting: Theory and Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Indonesia (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 19127, 2013).
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suspected SUD and life-saving treatment can effectively conscript
involved loved ones in helping a person with SUD find and obtain
care, unpaid.
These are only examples. For many sufferers, loved ones play
a vital and often personally costly role in almost every aspect of their
battle with SUD. Families devote countless hours to reducing the
harms of illness, accessing and navigating treatment, and assisting
their loved ones in their recovery. They provide support, shelter,
food, counseling, oversight, transportation, encouragement, love,
advocacy, and care, among other things.4
Scholarship addressing specifically the role of family in
fighting disease, including SUD, has appropriately focused on the
crucial and pressing question of whether family involvement helps
or hurts patients’ (or, sometimes, caregivers’) health outcomes
(meta-analyses of existing studies report that social relationships
significantly improve health outcomes on net),5 with some
exceptions.6 On this frame, whether deputization is a good idea or
not depends exclusively on whether it improves the health of those
directly impacted or not. This Article shows how our understanding
of the wisdom vel non of laws that deputize family members can
4

5

6

See generally Beverly Conyers, Addict in the Family: Stories of
Loss, Hope, and Recovery (2003); Bonnie Kaye, Jennifer Needle
in Her Arm: Healing from the Hell of my Daughter’s Drug
Overdose (2014); Chloe Silverman, Understanding Autism:
Parents, Doctors, and the History of a Disorder 235−36 (2012).
See Julianne Holt-Lunstad et al., Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A MetaAnalytic Review, 7 Pub. Libr. of Sci. 9 (2010) (discussing that, in a metaanalysis of 148 independent studies, social relationships (including living
alone, marital status, perceptions of loneliness, and so on) were found to
“significantly predict mortality” with an overall effect corresponding to “a
50% increase in odds of survival as a function of social relationships”); J. S.
House et al., Social Relationships and Health, 241 Science 540, 541 (1988)
(“Social relationships, or the relative lack thereof, constitute a major risk
factor for health—rivaling the effect of well-established health risk factors
such as cigarette smoking, blood pressure, blood lipids, obesity and physical
activity . . . .”); Candyce H. Kroenke et al., Social Networks, Social Support, and
Survival After Breast Cancer Diagnosis, 24 J. Clinical Oncology 1105 (2006)
(66% increased mortality among breast cancer patients who were socially
isolated, i.e., reported not having a “confidant”).
See Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 Yale J.
Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 147 (2016) (addressing care work burdens
on family in the context of long-term care). This Article seeks to build on
Hoffman’s study of long-term care by applying the focus on family care takers
to SUD, elaborating upon impacts care work has, and developing a welfare
economic framework to balance social consequences with health impacts.
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be improved by broadening our perspective to encompass not only
medical effects but also social consequences for patients and their
families.
Specifically, this Article draws from a line of feminist legal
scholarship problematizing “care work” in other contexts—in
particular childcare and long-term care—to identify considerations
other than health impacts that can affect the desirability of
deputizing family. These include the potential for interference
with existing family relationships, invisibility of the burden of care
work on loved ones, and inequality in the distribution of burdens
and benefits of care work. The Article then explores the real-world
implications of such difficult-to-quantify considerations, arguing
that their existence necessitates more cautious, research-informed
regulation; drawing from literature on cost-benefit analysis to offer a
normative framework for the weighing of such considerations given
incomplete evidence; and demonstrating the usefulness of that
framework by applying it to lay out the case for adopting an “active
choice” approach to deputizing family to obtain and share private
information about SUD treatment.
In short, the Article illustrates through its study of SUD
how assessment of laws that deputize family in health care can be
improved by considering the interference with family relationships,
invisible burdens, and inequality entailed in some such laws. The
Article then touches upon implications for deputizing family and the
development of family law beyond health care.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II offers background
and motivation. It shows how the addictions crisis and associated
“drug war” is a ready topic through which to explore laws that
deputize family because laws in this domain increasingly use family
as a regulatory tool and because family are a particularly potent tool
for diseases of despair such as addiction.
Part III draws from existing scholarship on care work in
other contexts to develop consequential normative considerations
for assessing laws that deputize family that include considerations
beyond direct health impacts. It argues that while health impacts are
of course a primary consequential concern, when weighing laws that
deputize family we must also consider the potential for interference
with family relationships, and the potential invisibility of care work,
the potential inequality of care work.
Part IV explores implications. In light of the behavioral
“knowledge problem,” it may be difficult to know for sure whether
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social consequences like those identified in Part III outweigh potential
health impacts to counsel against (or in favor of) any particular
reform. As a first step, new laws deputizing family should include
information-gathering provisions to enable ongoing assessment
of any social and health impacts that might support subsequent
revision, and policymakers should be hesitant to adopt reforms
that may interfere with family relationships without an evidentiary
basis for believing that such interference is medically justified.
Furthermore, “break-even” analysis employed to incorporate hardto-quantify variables into cost-benefit analysis in administrative law
and regulation can be used to account for social consequences. Part
IV shows how employing this approach supports a change to the
choice architecture of consent to disclosure of protected SUD health
information; patients should be given an “active choice” about
whether they consent to disclosure of their information to loved
ones. As compared to an “opt in” approach that favors isolation by
default, such an active choosing regime recognizes and encourages
underlying family relationships, brings family burdens to light, and
mitigates inequality in access to and burdens of family support.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes and discusses implications
beyond substance use disorder and beyond health care. While the
Article’s launching-off point and focus is the increasing deputization
of family in the “drug war,” its narrative framework and discussion
offer broader insights. Its normative approach is broadly applicable,
though additional variables for break-even analysis will depend on
context. More fundamentally, the “deputizing” frame that emerges
from a focus on the utilization of family as a regulatory tool in
public health helpfully collapses the public/private distinction that
has contributed to invisibility of care work in other contexts, but
problematically may do so by bringing all family life into the “public”
sphere.
II. Loved Ones as a Regulatory Tool in Public Health: the Case of
SUD
A. Leverage Points for Regulating SUD
Health law scholarship traditionally separated, for purposes
of analysis, laws’ impacts on health care cost, access, and quality
(in addition to ethical considerations).7 Scholarship in public health
7

E.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law, 41 Wake
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in recent years has shown us that we must consider also the social
determinants of health and the impact of health laws on harm
reduction.8 Thus, analyzing the consequences of law for health or
a disease requires at least considering a law’s impacts on social
determinants, harm reduction, access to health care, quality of care,
and cost.
In addressing SUD as with other chronic illnesses, this
framework for understanding a law’s potential impacts on health
maps roughly onto four key leverage points at which laws seek to or
foreseeably change behavior and outcomes. These leverage points
are prevention, harm reduction, access, and quality.9
First, prevention. The likelihood of contracting addiction in
the first place, which might be thought of as a person’s baseline
“health,” is a function not only of their vital characteristics but also
of their behaviors, access to transportation, housing, and other
social determinants. One engrained legal effort at reducing the risk
of addiction is criminal prohibition on drug use and sale associated

8

9

Forest L. Rev. 365, 379 (2006) (describing textbook separation of cost,
access, and quality, as well as ethics or autonomy, as considerations in health
law).
See generally Nancy E. Adler et al., Addressing Social Determinants of Health and
Health Inequalities, 316 JAMA 1641 (2016); Mary C. Brucker, Social Determinants
of Health, Nursing for Women’s Health 7 (2017); Victor R. Fuchs,
Social Determinants of Health: Caveats and Nuances, 317 JAMA 25 (2017). Harm
reduction can be conceptualized within “quality,” and is included under the
umbrella of “health impacts” in the framework I utilize below. However, it
is valuable to recognize the distinct importance of harm reduction because
“quality” in this context can too easily be assumed to mean “quality of medical
care,” i.e., to refer only to the treatment received from the provider itself.
Analyzing the legal framework for regulating any chronic illness by addressing
impacts on risk of disease, the harms of disease, access to treatment, and
quality of treatment does not track perfectly with the underlying health
concerns of social determinants, harm reduction, access, quality, and cost.
Social determinants of health impact every leverage point, from contraction
of disease to quality of treatment. And “cost” is not a single decision-making
or leverage point, but rather a consideration distinct from health that must
be accounted for in evaluating the effectiveness of a legal intervention
at any such point. Under conditions of scarcity, where funds are finite, it
is particularly important to consider cost as a “pro” or “con” of any given
regulatory approach, in addition to other considerations discussed below
including health impacts and social consequences. In such a case, “cost” in
dollars can be roughly translated into “opportunity cost” in terms of foregone
alternative policies or efforts. See Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84
Fordham L. Rev. 79, 99 (2015) (discussing this state of affairs).
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with the “drug war,”10 but housing policy, early intervention efforts,
medical prescribing and reimbursement policy, and insurance
coverage should not be overlooked as they play a significant role.11
For example, it is now well understood that a legal framework that
makes it more profitable for providers to treat apparent pain with a
simple opioid prescription than with more time-intensive approaches
contributes significantly to the spread of addiction.12
Second, harm reduction is an additional point of leverage at
which laws influence behavior to impact SUD outcomes. Some laws
seek to reduce the risk of fatal overdose, infection, or other harms
associated with addiction. Laws facilitating naloxone distribution
are a positive example of such harm reduction;13 by making it more
likely bystanders or first responders have access to this overdosereversing drug, such laws reduce the likelihood that an overdose
is deadly. But other laws arguably exacerbate the harms associated
with addiction. Prohibitions on drug use may push sufferers to use
in secret and unsafe environments, increasing the risk of infection or
10
11

12

13

See Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2173, 2174 nn. 3–4
(2015) (collecting sources problematizing the “war on drugs”).
See generally Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 261 (2010) (comparing
both historical and recent drug policies between the United States and
Britain); Sara Gordon, The Use and Abuse of Mutual-Support Programs in Drug
Courts, U. Ill. L. Rev. 1503 (2017) (highlighting drug courts as an important
but incomplete tool in drug addiction efforts); Laurie C. Malkin, Comment,
Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes
for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757 (1995) (encouraging
group homes for recovering substance addicts despite community opposition);
Ellen Weber, Equality Standards For Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 179 (2013) (explaining the prohibition of discriminatory
health insurance coverage for persons with mental health and substance use
disorders in large employer health plans).
E.g., Beth Han et al., Prescription Opioid Use, Misuse, and Use Disorders in U.S.
Adults: 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, Annals of Internal
Med. (2017), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/2300/2017/
AnnalsInternalMed.pdf (discussing role of prescription opioid availability and
misuse); Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Amid Opioid Crisis, Insurers Restrict
Pricey, Less Addictive Painkiller, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/17/health/opioid-painkillers-insurance-companies.
html (“Opioid drugs are generally cheap while safer alternatives are often more
expensive . . . doctors are given incentives to use less expensive treatments
that provide fast relief.”).
Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs, 50 State Review on Opioid Related
Policy 26−29 (2017) (providing overview of such laws).
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unsupervised overdose.14
Third, laws impact access to care. Access to treatment for SUD
depends on the interaction of a person seeking treatment, having a
way to pay for that treatment, and finding a provider available. As
an illustration, Medicaid reimbursement rates and conditions for
inpatient treatment have an obvious impact on the availability of
providers and, so, access to such treatment.15
Fourth, laws impact behavior and outcomes by influencing
the quality of treatment. This, in turn, influences the likelihood and
length of recovery for one who is able to access treatment. Laws
directly limiting or encouraging Medication Assisted Treatment
(“MAT”) have an impact on quality, because studies show MAT has
positive outcomes relative to other forms of treatment.16 Other laws
play a more subtle role. Current regulatory guidance interpreting the
Anti-Kickback Statute makes it difficult (though not impossible) for
providers to offer free transportation to get patients to treatment.17
Yet transportation is a factor in adherence to treatment and so
quality.18
14

15

16

17

18

Cf. Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the United
States, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 231, 232 (2008) (“In multivariate analyses of
an IDU cohort in Vancouver, S[afe ]I[njection ]F[acilities] use was negatively
associated with needle sharing . . . and positively associated with less frequent
reuse of syringes . . . .”).
See Note, Congressional Intent to Preclude Equitable Relief – Ex Parte Young After
Armstrong, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 832 (2018) (“The significance of the
Armstrong Court’s holding for the Medicaid providers seeking to enforce
the Medicaid Act was clear: their claims could not move forward”); Peter
Cunningham & Ann O’Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage Medicaid
Participation By Physicians?, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 1, 2009),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.28.1.w17#R3 (“Low
Medicaid reimbursement rates relative to those of Medicare and private payers
are usually considered to be the primary reason for low physician participation
in Medicaid.”).
See W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., No. 11-W-00307/3,
West Virginia Continuum of Care for Medicaid Enrollees with
Substance Use Disorders 7 tbl.1 (2017) (Sec. 1115 Waiver to expand
Medicaid reimbursement to IMD with fewer than 16 beds); Luis Sordo et al.,
Mortality Risk During and After Opioid Substitution Treatment: Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis of Cohort Studies, 357 BMJ 1, 12 (2017).
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(bb)(1)(i-v) (2018) (incorporating the language from:
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the
Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368 (Dec. 7,
2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001 and 1003)).
See, e.g., Samina T. Syed et al., Traveling Towards Disease: Transportation Barriers to
Health Care Access, 38 J. Community Health 976 (2013).
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B. Explicit Deputization
The United States public health regulatory framework for
addressing the addictions crisis uses many traditional regulatory
tools. These include information campaigns, prohibition of some
substances and regulation of others in an effort to reduce consumption,
and partially-subsidized health care for some sufferers.19 Increasingly,
however, efforts to prevent, treat, and reduce the harms of drug
addiction work through loved ones, explicitly using family members
as a regulatory tool to influence the behavior of their loved ones. 20
That is, the law deputizes family in achieving public health ends.21
19

20

21

See Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic
Determinants, 108 Am. J. Public Health 182 (2018) (discussing aspects of
framework); Fernando D. Simoes, Paternalism and Health Law: Legal Promotion
of a Healthy Lifestyle, 4 Eur. J. Risk. Reg. 347, 356–65 (2013) (surveying
and evaluating traditional tools of public health regulation in the context of
tackling obesity).
This Article uses the definition of “family” articulated in SAMHSA’s family
therapy treatment protocol: “While the definition of family may change
according to different circumstances” it includes “traditional families,”
“extended families,” and “elected families, which are self-identified and are
joined by choice and not by the usual ties of blood, marriage, and law” such
as godparents or close friends. In other words, “[f]or practical purposes,
family can be defined according to the individual client’s closest emotional
connections.” U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Treatment
Improvement Protocol 39, Substance Abuse Treatment and
Family Therapy, at xvi, 2 (2015).
By “deputize” this Article means intentionally or foreseeably using a third
party to influence a subject’s behavior. This may include laws that empower/
disempower third parties with formal legal responsibilities or obligations as
well as laws that influence the incentives of third parties, encouraging them
to intervene to alter others’ behavior. In seeking to capture pragmatically the
breadth of situations in which the law utilizes third parties as a regulatory tool,
this understanding is intentionally broader than the traditional understanding
of a sheriff “deputizing” some locals when need/emergency pressed. Cf.
Steven Lubet, The Forgotten Trial of Wyatt Earp, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 20 n.76
(2001) (describing significance in trial of the fact that while Earp had formally
deputized his brothers, Doc Holliday may not have actually been deputized
“when he joined Virgil Earp’s posse”). Rather, its use of the term is closer to
the use in federalism scholarship on federal laws that “deputize” states. E.g.,
David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement is Shared by the United States, the States,
and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1571 (1995) (“As a result, essentially
all the modern major environmental laws provide uniform, minimum national
standards with the states ‘deputized,’ to a greater or lesser degree, to do the
permitting and enforcing for the federal government.”). See generally Shirly
Lin, Comment, States of Resistance: The Real ID Act and Constitutional Limits Upon
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Prevention: Prohibition laws are a core, controversial aspect of
current federal and state efforts to reduce the harms of SUD.22 Laws
that forbid or restrict use or sale of certain addictive substances
seek to prevent people from developing SUD by preventing misuse.
But in some cases, such laws seek to enlist family in prevention-byprohibition by exposing them to liability for failing to intervene in
and halt prohibited uses or sales in their home or presence. Drug
possession laws and associated civil forfeiture penalties are an
example, putting a person’s home at risk if she fails to halt certain
drug activity engaged in by those staying with her, as a means to use
the homeowner to seek to alter her co-occupants’ behavior.23
Harm reduction: Efforts to reduce the harm of SUD, too,
increasingly operate through loved ones. Naloxone is a life-saving
drug that is relatively easy to administer and can prevent the death
of a person who is overdosing from opioids. Understandably,
increasing access to and utilization of Naloxone is a significant
focus of regulators and reformers. One way this is done is by
prescribing Naloxone prophylactically not only to those suffering
from SUD but also likely bystanders to an overdose, including family
members or friends. Hence the American Medical Association’s
guidance encouraging providers to prescribe naloxone to “a family
member or close friend” of SUD patients.24 Consistent with that
recommendation, many states have standing orders that explicitly
identify “family members” as eligible for third-party prescriptions
of Naloxone.25

22
23
24

25

Federal Deputization of State Agencies in the Regulation of Non-Citizens, 12 N.Y.
City L. Rev. 329 (2009) (exploring the post-9/11 deputization of state and
local authorities to investigate and detain undocumented immigrants). For
reflections on the narrative implications of labeling even family members who
the law foreseeably enlists in achieving government ends as “deputies,” see
infra Part V.
See Levin, supra note 10 (collecting sources expressing skepticism about “war
on drugs”).
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5803 (West 2018); (discussing civil forfeiture penalty).
Am. Med. Ass’n Opioid Task Force, Help Save Lives: Co-Prescribe Naloxone to
Patient’s at Risk of Overdose, End the Epidemic (2017), https://www.endopioid-epidemic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/AMA-Opioid-Task-Forcenaloxone-one-pager-updated-August-2017-FINAL-1.pdf.
E.g., Pa. Dep’t of Health, Standing Order DOH-002-2018, Naloxone
Prescription for Overdose Prevention (2018). See generally Legal
Science, Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws, Prescription Drug Abuse
Policy System (July 1, 2017), http://pdaps.org/datasets/laws-regulatingadministration-of-naloxone-1501695139 (providing a 50-state survey of
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Treatment: One of several challenges to providing treatment
to those suffering from SUD is that the nature of the illness,
coupled with the stigma surrounding it, makes sufferers less likely
to pursue treatment voluntarily.26 Involuntary treatment laws are
a controversial attempt to address this challenge. Such laws create
a mechanism through which SUD sufferers can be forced into
treatment without their consent. For present purposes, it suffices
to note that such laws often explicitly deputize family, limiting the
class of persons eligible to initiate the involuntary treatment process
to guardians and family members.27
Quality: Finally, treatment protocols that call for incorporating
family into the recovery process are an example of policies that seek
to impact the quality of care through the behavior of family members.
For example, the “Recovery Oriented Community” program calls
upon family members to take a formal, active, and ongoing role
in their loved one’s recovery,28 in recognition of years of research
indicating that social relationships such as family involvement are
a significant positive influence on recovery.29 Family members are
actively incorporated in developing the treatment protocol and
enrolled in a communication program through which they and

26

27

28
29

Naloxone access laws).
Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052,
6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (noting concern that
“individuals with substance use disorders [fail to] seek needed treatment” due
to concern about negative consequences of the disclosure of such treatment to
employers, landlords, law enforcement, and others).
E.g., S.B. 391, Gen. Assemb., 2017−18 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017) (“A spouse,
relative or guardian of the respondent must file the [involuntary treatment]
petition.”). Indeed, such laws are occasionally referred to as “Casey’s Laws,”
named after the first such law in Kentucky which was motivated in part by
one family’s story of their son dying of a drug overdose after the legal system
rebuffed the family’s efforts to force their son into involuntary treatment. For
an example of the use of this term and discussion of the Kentucky law, see
Bradley J. Steffen, Battling the Heroin Epidemic with Involuntary Treatment, 12 J. L.
& Soc. Deviance 181, 204−13 (2016).
Lori Simons et al., A Promising Approach for Families of and Young Adults with
Opioid-Related Disorders: The Recovery Oriented Community (ROC) Program, 2 J.
Drug Abuse 1 (2016).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of social
relationships on recovery in other contexts); Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the
Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug Treatment in Communities,
57 Rutgers L. Rev. 631, 653 n.79 (2005) (“Sustaining recovery is also
more difficult for individuals who do not have access to . . . a family support
system.”).
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medical providers maintain contact through telephone, text, online
support, and weekly meetings.
C. Implicit Deputization
In many areas the deputization of family is implicit rather
than explicit, though no less important. Family are on the front
lines of each leverage point of SUD—prevention, harm reduction,
treatment, and recovery, though their role as an aspect of our public
health system is sometimes not appreciated.30 Family can discourage
substance misuse, help to identify and encourage treatment for
comorbidities of addiction such as mental illness, and help to
identify and encourage early treatment of SUD, thereby reducing
the risk and severity of addiction.31
Moreover, for those who suffer from SUD, family can play
a key role in harm reduction. Family may provide relatively safe
housing and, often, a place to use drugs with some sort of supervision
and help nearby.32
Similarly, family can play a key role in facilitating access
30

31

32

See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Facing Addiction in
America: The Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and
Health 1‑3 (2016) [hereinafter Surgeon General’s Report] (providing
exhaustive list of “public, private, and voluntary entities that contribute to the
delivery of essential public health services within a jurisdiction” and make up
the “Public Health System” but not mentioning role of family in provision of
such services); see also id. at 1‑4 (same).
Jeffrey M. Jones, Poll: Only About Half of Addicted Family Members Sought Treatment,
Gallup News Serv. (Aug. 18, 2006), http://news.gallup.com/poll/24196/
poll-only-about-half-addicted-family-members-sought-treatment.aspx
(showing that pressure from family was among the most common factors in
SUD patients’ decisions to seek treatment).
E.g., Sarah M. Bagley et al., Overdose Education and Naloxone Rescue Kits for
Family Members of Individuals Who Use Opioids: Characteristics, Motivations, and
Naloxone Use, 36 Substance Abuse 149, 151 tbl. 1 (reporting successful
Massachusetts program to train family members in use of naloxone);
Alexandra Rockey Fleming, For Families of Addicts, Narcan Has Truly Been a
Lifesaving Drug, Wash. Post (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/health-science/for-families-of-addicts-narcan-has-truly-beena-lifesaving-drug/2018/01/05/75ffb206-d469-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_
story.html?utm_term=.03703597a46d (telling story of mother who revived
her 22-year-old son from an overdose in the home they shared using Narcan;
he then entered an inpatient treatment program); Anna V. Williams et al.,
Training Family Members to Manage Heroin Overdose and Administer Naloxone:
Randomized Trial of Effects on Knowledge and Attitudes, 109 Addiction 250
(2013) (reporting positive educational outcomes from take-home naloxone
administration training).
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to treatment for those with SUD. Family may press sufferers to
seek treatment.33 They may help to arrange or apply for insurance
coverage, or provide financial support where coverage is lacking.34
They help to find available (and covered) treatment and get their
loved ones into such treatment.35
Finally, SUD patients often invite their family to play a key
role in maintaining recovery from SUD as well. Recovery may be
aided by not just traditional medical care but transportation (for
possible probation check-ins, MAT, or work), housing, meaningful
employment or other engagement, help navigating the criminal
justice system, child care, and above all community. Whether
motivated by love, altruism, or even filial support requirements,
family provide all of these things.36
33

34

35

36

See W.R. Miller et al., Engaging the Unmotivated in Treatment for Alcohol Problems:
A Comparison of Three Strategies for Intervention Through Family Members, 67 J.
Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 688 (1999). Particularly for adolescents
“family pressure may play an important role in getting adolescents to enter,
stay in, and complete treatment.” Surgeon General’s Report, supra note
30, at 4‑14.
E.g., Liz Navratil, Tell Them My Story: Ross Woman’s Obituary Sheds Light on
Addiction, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.postgazette.com/news/overdosed/2017/01/22/Tell-them-my-story-Maybeit-would-help-somebody-Ross-Pittsburgh-overdose-obituary-addiction/
stories/201701220121 (describing fatal overdose of young woman while she
and her mother were working to find a treatment facility covered by their
insurance after calendar-year change in insurance led to dropped coverage at
originally-planned treatment center); Jeanne Whalen, After Addiction Comes
Families’ Second Blow: The Crushing Cost of Rehab, Wall Street J. (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-addiction-comes-families-secondblow-crushing-cost-of-rehab-1520528850.
For a story of a mother buying heroin for her daughter to help wean her
during a self-detox in order for her to be admitted to a treatment program
that did not accept those in active addiction, see Anonymous, Why I Bought
My Daughter Heroin, BBC News (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/
magazine-39212295.
“[F]indings from focus groups of counselors in rural areas noted . . .
reliance on friends or family for transportation.” U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., The President’s Commission on Combating Drug
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis 34 (2017) [hereinafter Commission
Report]. On the reasons family engage in care work see Hoffman, supra note
6, at 175 (discussing reasons family members engage in care work); “All fifty
states have statutes that obligate certain adults to care for or financially support
certain other family members.” Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the
Modern Era: Domestic and International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws
Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 Elder Law J. 269, 270
(2013). However, these are limited, for example, while “parents can [] be
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It would be a mistake to think of this range of family
involvement in SUD prevention, harm reduction, treatment, and
recovery as independent of law, separate from and outside of our
public health framework for regulating (and aspirationally reducing
the cost of) SUD. Quite the opposite, our legal framework calls upon
family to serve this role in ways that are at least foreseeable, if not
intentional.
SUD is an example of a chronic illness for which resources
available through traditional public health, health care, and
government entities are, at this writing, tragically insufficient.
Institutional actors do not come close to ensuring that those who
need treatment for SUD receive it; according to recent estimates,
roughly 20% of the 20 million who need treatment for SUD receive
it.37 As a result, for many sufferers, loved ones are both the first
responders and the last resort.
Meanwhile, family members are not only a stopgap; they
are well positioned to assist with many aspects of prevention, harm
reduction, treatment, and recovery. Family members are often close
to SUD patients which brings a special perspective and insight into
their loved ones’ behaviors and needs.38 Moreover, the emotional
connection that defines “family” makes family members particularly
well suited to provide the community that many see as essential to
preventing and treating addiction.39 And family can be (even if they

37
38

39

obligated to pay support for adult-aged children . . . usually that obligation is
tied to a continuing disability that preexisted age eighteen.” Id.
“[O]nly one in five people who currently need treatment for opioid use
disorders is actually receiving it.” Surgeon General’s Report, supra note
30, at III.
See Silverman, supra note 4, at 9 (“To care well, Kittay argues, caregivers
must not only go through the motions of care, but they must also care about
the person who depends on them . . . to do a good job with the rational,
arduous, daily labor of caring, an ‘affective bond’ is necessary.”); id. at 96
(identifying three comparative advantages of parents in assisting in a child’s
treatment: “a familiarity with their child’s developmental trajectory and
current behaviors . . . the continuous therapeutic opportunities offered by
the activities of daily life, and their own biological kinship with the child,
including shared personality traits and milder forms of the same symptoms”);
id. at 137 (“As parents enter into professional areas of authority they do so
by claiming that their love helps them determine how best to understand
and treat their children. These claims about love are strong and sometimes
risky.”).
See Dasgupta et al., supra note 19, at 184 (“[R]esearchers agree that such
structural factors as lack of economic opportunity, poor working conditions,
and eroded social capital in depressed communities, accompanied by
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are not always) powerful sources of acceptance.40
As a result of the confluence of a shortage of social services
and family’s unique ability to assist in addressing SUD, it is difficult
to identify a way in which family currently assist their loved ones
with SUD that is not predictably influenced by one or more aspects
of our existing legal framework. Among other legal factors, the
Anti-Kickback Statute limits providers’ ability to provide patients
in recovery with free transportation and payer reimbursement
policies that fail to compensate such arrangements often leave those
in recovery with no way to obtain necessary, daily treatment, other
than reliance on loved ones with legal access to a car.41 Shortages
of Medicaid-eligible inpatient and outpatient treatment providers—
itself a function of Medicaid reimbursement rates42—often leave
family members with the choice to either pay out of pocket
themselves for their loved ones’ care or see them go without care.
Lack of housing and job support for those in recovery, 43 as a matter
of logic and inevitable necessity, can leave family invested in their
loved ones’ health as the patient’s last resort.
The goal of this discussion has been to call attention to such
implicit deputization and encourage researchers and policymakers

40

41

42
43

hopelessness and despair, are root causes of the misuse of opioids and other
substances . . . .”) (quoting Nat’l Acad’s of Sci’s, Eng’g, and Med.
et al., Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic 1–9 (Richard J.
Bonnie et al. eds., 2017)).
Cf. Silverman, supra note 4, at 236 (“Devotion is ideally an experimental
procedure. It is especially so when, as parents often feel in the case of autism,
it impels us to consider the object of our love as both a biological being,
subject to manipulation and harm, and a person, precious and complete in his
or her own right.”).
See Robert J. Baror, Transportation and the Anti-Kickback Statute: A Tortured Route
with a New Safe Harbor, The Fed. Law., March 2015, at 18–20 (describing
challenges entailed in providing transportation); Jeffrey Samet et al., It’s Time
for Methadone to Be Prescribed as Part of Primary Care, Statnews (July 5, 2018),
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/05/methadone-prescribed-primarycare/ (“Stigma and a not-in-my-backyard mentality resulted in the placement
of a sizable number of methadone clinics in locations that were hard for many
to reach.”).
See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015)
(discussing claim that low Medicaid reimbursement rates deterred provider
participation).
See Richard Littlewood et al., Housing for People with Substance Use Disorders: One
Size Does Not Fit All Tenants—Assessment of 16 Housing Services and Suggestions for
Improvement Based on Real World Experience, 55 Community Mental Health
J., 331 (2019).
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to be cognizant of it, not to catalog all instances of deputization. In
these areas and the many others in which the law implicitly deputizes
family, for those with loved ones who are in a position to be asked
for help, the choice is not whether society will provide necessary
services or not; the choice is whether it will do so through (usually
paid) social workers, medical providers, and navigators or through
(always unpaid) family members. As discussed in the next section,
whether done implicitly or explicitly, the decision to deputize family
is a weighty choice that implicates considerations beyond the health
of the patient.
III. The Social Consequences of Deputizing Family
The preceding discussion of the role of family in fighting
SUD underscores the importance of directing resources toward
family caretakers. Family support groups like Learn to Cope
based in Massachusetts, The Partnership for Drug Free Kids, Al
Anon, Shatterproof, and others could be supported and spread,
and educational resources could be improved in quality and made
more readily available.44 Moreover, funding directed specifically
44

Twelve Massachusetts-area organizations offering peer family support
services are listed in the Massachusetts Organization for Addiction Recovery.
Mass. Org. for Addiction Recovery, MOAR Mini-Guide with
MOAR to Come 15 (2018), http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/8256b8_
c57f31e039d547cbb67e13fb84c6ceed.pdf. In other communities, such
peer family support is not as readily available. See generally Addiction
Resource Hub, https://resources.facingaddiction.org (last visited Nov.
5, 2018). As for the availability of resources, the self-professed struggles of
noted addiction reformers and policy experts are illustrative. University of
Pennsylvania addiction research psychologist and former Senior Scientist for
the Office of National Drug Control Policy Dr. Thomas McLellan explains
that despite his expertise he found finding out how best to help care for a
family member extremely difficult, observing “[i]f I don’t know, nobody else
knows . . . . Where does a schoolteacher turn? How about a truck driver? How
about a cop?” See How to Fix Rehab: Expert Who Lost Son to Addiction Has a Plan,
nbcnews.com (Apr. 7, 2014, 5:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
americas-heroin-epidemic/how-fix-rehab-expert-who-lost-son-addictionhas-plan-n67946. Similarly, founder and CEO of Shatterproof Gary Mendell
explains how his family “fought to navigate the complex and confusing web of
treatment programs and therapies” in trying to care for a family member with
SUD. Gary Mendell, A Father’s Promise, History, Shatter Proof, https://
www.shatterproof.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 2019). There are some
excellent resources available, but particularly for a sufferer or family member
new to addiction and its treatment, availability of information does not equal
access to information.
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to educating family members could ensure culturally competent
resources by linking together families with similar backgrounds.45
Such efforts could make family more effective in supporting those
with addiction while simultaneously reducing the personal financial
and emotional burdens of providing such support.
For some, this broader policy implication—that family of
patients play a huge role in fighting disease and so are a promising
target for resources, funding, and regulation—may not need further
elaboration. It is important, however, to focus on the costs and
benefits of deputizing family in fighting disease, for four reasons.
First, family involvement may in some cases be a negative
rather than a positive; it may do more harm than good. A stark
example is that of an abusive spouse—the law should neither
empower an abusive person nor force their spouse to rely on them
for support or care in seeking treatment for illness.46 Teasing out the
costs and benefits of deputizing family makes it possible to explore
whether current and proposed regulatory approaches do more harm
than good.
Second, funding and manpower are finite; this is particularly
true for SUD. We must sometimes decide not only which laws or
approaches are beneficial, but which are sufficiently beneficial to
justify the investment of scarce resources.
Third, legal scholars evaluating the wisdom vel non of
involuntary treatment laws have begun to explore behavioral,
societal, and ethical costs of such laws independent of their medical
impacts.47 This growing, fuller understanding of the implications of
such laws is improved by exploring their impacts on the deputized
45
46
47

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 280i-1 (2018) (specific provision for educating families in
addressing autism).
See generally Symposium on Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women by Intimate
Partners: Critical Issues, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1193 (1995).
See Leo Beletsky et al., Expanding Coercive Treatment is the Wrong Solution for the
Opioid Crisis, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Feb. 11, 2016), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160211.053127/full/
(noting
risk that threat of involuntary treatment will deter patients from seeking
professional help); Leo Beletsky & Elisabeth Ryan, The Wrong Path: Involuntary
Treatment and the Opioid Crisis, Crime Rep. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://
thecrimereport.org/2017/08/16/the-wrong-path-involuntary-treatment-andthe-opioid-crisis/ (involuntary treatment “shift[s] financial responsibility for
substance use treatment from insurers directly to taxpayers”); Ish P. Bhalla
et al., The Role of Civil Commitment in the Opioid Crisis, 46 J. L. Med. & Ethics
343 (2018) (discussing medical as well as ethical objections to involuntary
treatment).
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family members as well.
Fourth, and finally, for those who are interested not only in
reducing the harms of SUD but also putting in place structures to
better address the next such crisis (which may well also be related to
SUD), there are lessons to be taken from the failures and successes
of our policy response thus far to the overdose crisis. Unlike
researchers and policymakers, sick people do not have the luxury of
waiting on political processes or scientific debates. Again, patients
and their families are the first responders for any illness and, unless
and until government or institutional resources are brought to bear,
the last resort. By better understanding this default, double-edged
weapon in the public health arsenal it may be possible to design
policies that make family better at the job that illness, indifference,
or choice force them to do, or at least to avoid hampering family in
such work when desired by their loved ones. The addictions crisis
reveals numerous ideas, examples, and potential pitfalls that can
serve as lessons for the future.
Part A below discusses the health impacts of laws deputizing
family to address SUD. Part B discusses the need to consider impacts
beyond direct consequences on patient health, namely, the social
consequences of deputization, then discusses such impacts that
are particularly implicated by laws deputizing family: interference,
invisibility, and inequality. The next Part will offer and apply a
framework for weighing such social consequences against health
impacts in evaluating or crafting laws that deputize family from a
welfare economic standpoint.
A. Health Consequences of Deputization
In addressing a disease—particularly one as widespread,
debilitating, and deadly as SUD—it is natural and appropriate to
focus on the health impacts of any reform or regulatory tool. So it
is understandable that most scholarship that focuses on the role of
family in the treatment of disease generally and in the treatment of
SUD in particular has focused on medical impacts rather than on
other potential benefits or costs of deputizing family.48 This is in
48

See D.W. Best et al., Patterns of Family Conflict and Their Impact on Substance Use
and Psychosocial Outcomes in a Sample of Young People in Treatment, 9 Vulnerable
Child. & Youth Stud. 114, 114–22 (2014); Viviana E. Horigian et al., A
Cross-Sectional Assessment of the Long Term Effects of Brief Strategic Family Therapy for
Adolescent Substance Use, 24 Am. J. on Addiction 637 (2015) (discussing the
specific outcomes of therapy focused on familial intervention and strengthening
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contrast to scholarship on the provider-patient relationship, which
has problematized laws that deputize doctors in bringing about
particular policy outcomes.49
This health-focused research has tended to find that social
relationships are a significant positive for SUD outcomes,50 though

49

50

of familial bond in the aftermath of substance use). See generally Holt-Lunstad
et al., supra note 5. Family Law textbooks address drug and alcohol use insofar
as they may be implicated in divorce or custody proceedings but do not
directly address the role or use of the family in prevention and treatment of
SUD, chronic illness, or public health. See generally John DeWitt Gregory
et al., Understanding Family Law (4th ed. 2013); Ira Mark Ellman
et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems (5th ed. 2010).
See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan
Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 New Eng. L. Rev. 293, 294, 318−19
(2014) (describing Drudge Report headline that “Obama Deputizes Doctors”
in response to Executive Order interpreting ACA provision as leaving doctors
free to ask patients about guns and gun safety” (citing Affordable Care Act,
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17 (2012)); Carol Gosain, Case Note, Protective Custody for
Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel.
Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 799, 817 (1997) (discussing state
law, complaining that “[b]y ‘deputizing’ doctors, the state interferes in the
physician-patient relationship”); Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Note, Punitive Policies:
Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consensual Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5
Health Matrix 443, 455 (1995) (criticizing requirement that physicians
disclose pre-natal drug test results as “effectively ‘deputiz[ing] doctors to be
police informers’”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 22, 34 (1992) (describing requirements that physicians inform
a woman seeking abortion of certain information as “deputiz[ing] doctors”
in framing choice); id. at 94 (noting that Casey essentially held that “the state
could no more deputize doctors than husbands as anti-abortion advocates”).
Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 30, at 3‑11 (“A number of familyfocused, universal prevention interventions show substantial preventive
effects on substance use.”); id. at 4‑30 (“Mainstream health care has long
acknowledged the benefits of engaging family and social supports to
improve treatment adherence and to promote behavioral changes needed to
effectively treatment many chronic illnesses. This is also true for patients with
substance use disorders.”); id. at 4‑25 (“Adherence to” naltrexone “increases
under conditions where it is administered and observed by a trusted family
member.”); see Simons et al., supra note 28, at 1−2 (“Most treatment research
indicates that a family component is necessary for treatment to be effective,
particularly with opiate addicts aged 15 to 25 years old.”) (collecting sources);
see also id. at 2 (describing study as indicating “that families play a crucial role
in the recovery process for adults with concurrent disorders”); Dasgupta et al.,
supra note 19, at 184 (providing evidence that social isolation contributes to
drug misuse and substance misuse disorder and, conversely, that “protective
family and social structures generate resilience that mitigates negative impacts
from the collision of economic hardship, substance use, and depression”)
(collecting sources); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note
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scholars have questioned the health benefit of empowering family
in specific areas such as involuntary treatment.51 The finding that
family involvement has a salutary effect on SUD health outcomes is
consistent with meta analyses addressing the health impacts of family
involvement generally, which have found family to be a significant
and positive social determinant of health.52 That said, none of these
studies compared family support to other forms of social services, so
the identified benefits may indicate only that family may fill a void
where other social services are lacking, not that family are better
than other more traditionally “public” sources of social services at
promoting health when both are available.53
B. Social Consequences of Deputization
It is appropriate for health impacts to be a primary focus
of inquiry in consequential evaluation of laws directed at disease,
but they should not be the only impacts considered. Such laws can
have social, educational, employment, and financial consequences
beyond their medical impacts. For a concrete example of such a
“social consequence” of health care policy, look no further than the
well-documented phenomenon of medical bankruptcy: bankruptcies
that result ultimately from our regulatory framework for managing

51
52
53

20, at 1 (“The family has a central role to play in the treatment of any health
problem, including substance abuse.”); id. (“[E]vidence from the research that
has been conducted . . . indicates that substance abuse treatment that includes
family therapy works better than substance abuse treatments that do not .
. . .”) (collecting sources); U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
Treatment Improvement Protocol 38, Integrating Substance
Abuse Treatment and Vocational Services, at xv (2000) (“Years of
research show that the best predictors of successful substance abuse treatment
are gainful employment[,] adequate family support[, and] lack of coexisting
mental illness . . . .”); cf. Kay Hymowitz, Opioid Deaths Are Surging Among Single
and Divorced Americans, Especially Men, Inst. for Family Studies (Nov. 6,
2017), https://ifstudies.org/blog/opioid-deaths-are-surging-among-singleand-divorced-americans-especially-men (finding lower overdose rate among
married population than non-married population, but noting that assuming
causative connection would be problematic).
See, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 19 (arguing for an approach that addresses
the root causes of the opioid crisis).
See sources cited supra note 5.
Cf. Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of
Dependency, at xviii (2004) (“It is very important to understand the roles
assigned to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be played
by other institutions, such as the market or the state.”).

216

Lawrence

illness.54
A strand of feminist legal scholarship problematizing “care
work” largely in the context of child care and long-term care for
the elderly—unpaid labor by family caring for one another—
has unpacked social consequences that such labor implicates
independent of health impacts.55 These considerations apply as
well to laws that deputize family in fighting SUD, in many cases
raising the possibility of new objections to or problems with such
laws as discussed below. Understood in welfare economic terms,
such considerations include: the potential for interference with
the underlying family relationship; the invisibility of and lack of
compensation for or societal recognition of the care work; and the
inequality of relying on care work, particularly when its performance
or availability is heterogeneous across genders, race, or class.
1. Interference
It is prudent to proceed with caution in using existing family
relationships as a regulatory tool because family relationships
themselves can be endogenous to the law, that is, family relationships
can be shaped by the law. As Fineman puts it, “[f]ar from being
separate and private, the family interacts with and is acted upon
by other societal institutions . . . the very relationship is not one of
separation, but of symbiosis.”56 Indeed, a motivating insight of the
field of family law is that the formation of romantic partnerships and
child rearing units is in some ways determined by legal recognition
and treatment, so laws may be tailored to facilitate those relationships
54
55

56

See Matthew J. Lawrence, Health Insurance’s Social Consequences Problem and
How to Solve It, Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (collecting and
describing sources).
See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172−73 nn.125−29 (collecting sources and
surveying); Anne L. Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their
Children and What Society Owes Parents (2005) ; Fineman, supra
note 53; Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work
Conflict and What to Do About It (2001); Sylvia A. Law, Women,
Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249 (1983);
Katherine B. Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1 (1996); Noah Zatz, Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care, 5 Harv.
L. & Pol’y Rev. 45 (2011)
Fineman, supra note 53. For a multi-layered example of the interaction
between legal and institutional arrangements, on the one hand, and affective
relationships on the other, in the context of a particular disorder, see generally
Silverman, supra note 4, at 1−5 (framing love as a complicated and
sometimes problematic resource).
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that society deems valuable.57
The spousal evidentiary privilege serves as an enduring
acknowledgement of this potential for the law to interfere with
family relationships. This potential is a primary underlying rationale
for the privilege. The reasoning is that if spouses could be compelled
to testify against each other, then open communication between
them would be chilled. So, courts provide an evidentiary privilege
to such communications, protecting against disclosure in order to
ensure that open communication between spouses is not deterred
by the shadow of civil or criminal discovery.58
In the context of SUD, this concern can be thought of as
one of interference. Supportive family relationships are desirable
both in the abstract and for their generally positive impact on SUD
outcomes.59 Laws that interfere with the formation or maintenance
of such relationships—that make it more costly for those with SUD
to maintain close contact with their loved ones—could carry an
interference cost that might itself outweigh any hypothetical medical
benefit.
The collateral consequences of civil forfeiture drug laws are a
concrete illustration of this problematic interference effect associated
with certain forms of deputization. Criminal accessory laws can make
families vulnerable to civil forfeiture actions against their homes for
57

58

59

Fineman, supra note 53 (“It is very important to understand the roles assigned
to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be played by other
institutions, such as the market or the state.”); Linda McClain, The Place
of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility
3, 8 (2006) (“[F]amilies have a place in the project of forming persons into
capable, responsible, self-governing citizens. . . . [G]overnment properly
takes an interest in families in light of the goods associated with families,
the functions that families serve, and the political values at stake.”); Vivian
Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, 11 J. Gender, Race & Justice 1
(2007) (providing survey of government policies promoting marriage).
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (“The modern justification
for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in
fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.”); see also
Development in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450,
1579 (1985) (“Advocates of the privileges argue that privileges encourage
intrafamily communications that are more valuable to the family than the
evidence shielded from the courts is to society.”); cf. Julia Cardozo, Note,
Let My Love Open the Door: The Case for Extending Martial Privileges to Unmarried
Cohabitants, 10 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 375 (2010)
(arguing for expansion of marital communications privilege to unmarried
cohabitants).
Supra Part III.A.
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unlawful sales conducted by loved ones living with them. Several
families in Philadelphia, for example, had their homes seized and
were forced to vacate after the police arrested non-minor children on
possession and sale charges that the families had permitted to live
with them. Eventually, the police permitted the families to return to
their homes—but allegedly only upon the condition that they would
not let their SUD-patient loved ones return.60
Deputization and interference are both crystallized in this
example. Drug laws conscript family members in the effort to
prevent SUD by prohibition by subjecting them to penalties if they
do not themselves ensure compliance with such prohibitions within
their homes. Regardless whether this deputization carries medical
benefits or costs, it also interferes directly with family relationships
by discouraging sufferers from seeking housing with loved ones,
and discouraging loved ones from permitting sufferers to live with
them while using. By doing so, in turn, drug laws may undercut the
ability of the family home to act as a sort of de facto safe injection site,
potentially undermining health in turn.61
2. Invisibility
A second consideration presented by laws that deputize family is that
the burdens of care work are often invisible, neither compensated nor
recognized as a valuable form of work. In turn, because such efforts
are invisible, policymakers can easily fail to take burdens on care
workers into account. Benefits programs, for example, often fail to
acknowledge the value, time, or effort of care work.62 In the context of
60

61

62

See Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 116,
Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No.
14-4687) (alleging that the ADA “informed Mr. Sourovelis that in order for
his house to be unsealed so his family could return home, he and his wife
would have to agree to a number of conditions, including agreeing that [their
son] would not be permitted to enter his home for any reason for an indefinite
period of time”). See generally Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp.
3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015). The case was later the subject of a civil lawsuit that
partially settled. See Jeremy Roebuck, D.A.’s Office Reaches Partial Settlement
in Forfeiture Suit, The Philadelphia Inquirer (June 24, 2015), http://
www.philly.com/philly/news/20150625_Phila__District_Attorney_reaches_
partial_settlement_in_civil_forfeiture_suit.html?mobi=true.
See Jennifer Ng et al., Does Evidence Support Supervised Injection Sites?, 63 Canada
Fam. Physician 866 (2017) (providing data supporting the positive outcomes
of safe injection sites); cf. supra Part II.A (collecting sources reporting positive
results from providing family members with access to Naloxone).
See Zatz supra note 55, at 46; see also Hoffman, supra note 6, at 196.
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childcare, the care work literature has “made compelling arguments
for state support of caregiving based on the idea of caregiving as
a public responsibility, a public good, a basic household need, or
in order to help preserve women’s attachment to the workplace.”63
Moreover, when it comes to helping in a loved one’s battle with
illness, the invisibility of care work can mean an under-supply of
educational resources and supports, which can leave care workers
to teach themselves, even where minimal educational resources and
support could go a long way in reducing the burdens on such care
givers and improving the quality of their help.64
Helping a loved one in his or her medical struggle can be
no less burdensome than child rearing or long-term care.65 For
example, family caregivers of terminal cancer patients may suffer
from “substantial psychological, occupational and economic burdens
associated with caregiving.”66 Stenberg’s literature review of 164
articles found similar burdens on caregivers of cancer patients.67
The burdens of care work are weighty in the treatment of
SUD as well, though not yet studied as significantly. Caring for a
loved one with SUD can be personally, psychologically, emotionally,
and financially devastating—even if it also can be tremendously
rewarding.68 Notably, many of these impacts stem not from having
a loved one who is ill, but from the care work that comes with the
diagnosis.69 As discussed above, the work loved ones do includes
63
64

65
66
67

68
69

Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172−73 nn.125−130 (collecting and surveying
sources).
Silverman, supra note 4, at 94 (describing “parents during the 1960s
and 1970s who often found themselves with few resources other than each
other in learning to treat their children”); id. at 96 (“[U]ntil the professional
community can offer us more effective programs, we will often have to take
matters into our own hands . . . .”).
Id. at 179−80 (“It is a full-time job driven by love, but accomplished
through reason and experience, because ‘[t]his is our work. Everything else
vanishes.’”).
Eva Grunfeld et al., Family Caregiver Burden: Results of a Longitudinal Study of
Breast Cancer Patients and Their Principal Caregivers, 170 Can. Med. Assoc. J.
1795, 1800 (2004).
See Una Stenberg et al., Review of the Literature on the Effects of Caring for a Patient
with Cancer, 19 Psychooncology 1013 (2010)(reviewing 164 researchbased articles finding significant problems borne by family caregivers of
cancer patients, including physical, social, and emotional problems and job
and financial impacts).
See generally Conyers, supra note 4; Kaye, supra note 4.
Dennis C. Daley, Family and Social Aspects of Substance Use Disorders, 21 J. Food
& Drug Analysis S73 (2013) (discussing emotional burden, economic
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transportation, advocacy, oversight, treatment, research, scheduling,
and counseling. Yet the costs associated with these efforts are too often
overlooked. Indeed, even while the President’s Opioid Commission
counted impacts on family members among the “inestimable” costs
of the opioid epidemic, it acknowledged only their “suffering . . . as
witnesses to addiction,” not the time, effort, money, or lead role in
care that family members often take on.70 Family can in some ways
be participants, not just witnesses, in their loved ones’ battle with
addiction.
It should not be surprising, then, that public programs may
fail to recognize the burden of care work to support those with
SUD. Medicaid state waiver guidance published by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) on January 11, 2018
is a recent example. Medicaid is a federal program by which states
provide health insurance, subsidized by the federal government, to
low income persons pursuant to federal standards. Under section
1115 of the Medicaid statute, states may seek a “waiver” permitting
them to alter eligibility, reimbursement, and other statutorily
mandated criteria for their state Medicaid programs.
Several states have publicly expressed interest since the

70

burden, relationship distress, and other adverse impacts of SUD on family
members); see also id. (collecting sources). Daley’s encapsulation of the range
of effects of SUD on family members warrants repeating in full: “Emotional
burden. Members may feel anger, frustration, anxiety, fear, worry, depression,
shame and guilt, or embarrassment. Economic burden. This may be caused by
money spent on substances, or money problems associated with the loss of
jobs or reliance on public assistance. Relationship distress or dissatisfaction.
Families may experience high rates of tension and conflict related to the SUD
and problems it causes in the family instability. This may result from abuse or
violence, or family breakup due to separation, divorce, or removal of children
from the home by Children and Youth Services. Effects on the developing
fetus and children. Alcohol use during pregnancy can harm fetal development
causing birth defects and problems in child development. Infants born
to opioid-dependent mothers are at increased risk for neonatal abstinence
syndrome, which can contribute to developmental or cognitive delays.
Children of parents with SUDs are at increased risk for abuse or neglect,
physical problems, poor behavioral or impulse control, poor emotional
regulation, conduct or oppositional disorders, poorer academic performance,
psychiatric problems such as depression or anxiety, and substance abuse.
Effects on parents. Mothers with SUDs may show less sensitivity and
emotional availability to infants. Parents of a child with a SUD may feel guilty,
helpless, frustrated, angry, or depressed.” Id.
The President’s Comm’n on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis,
Opinion Letter on Recommendations to Combat the Addiction Crisis (Nov. 1,
2017), at 31.
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beginning of the Trump Administration in using the 1115 waiver
process to create some form of a “work requirement,” also called
“community engagement,” that would make a person’s eligibility for
Medicaid contingent on her maintenance of gainful employment or
other community engagement.71
In its January 11, 2018 guidance, CMS described how it
recommends a state craft a waiver with some form of employment
requirement in order to maximize the likelihood of CMS approval.72
The document recognized that many who receive Medicaid
are “engaged as caregivers for young children or elderly family
members” and encourages states to recognize such care work. And
the document explicitly addresses treatment of those “with opioid
addiction and other substance use disorder,” again encouraging
states to accommodate such individuals. But its list of potentially
accommodating measures is focused exclusively on the Medicaid
eligibility of the SUD patients themselves.
Absent from the CMS guidance’s policy recommendations
on care work and SUD is recognition of the time and effort many
family members put into caring for loved ones with SUD. This invites
state requirements that fail to recognize the value of such work and,
counter-productively, force low-income family members to choose
between either devoting daily attention and time to their loved ones’
illness or continuing to receive Medicaid.73 In other words, it invites
71

72
73

Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70
Stan. L. Rev. 1689, 1743 (2018) (“Like Indiana’s, Pennsylvania’s, and
those of other states before it, Kentucky’s waiver proposal included work
requirements for the population Governor Bevin called the ‘able-bodied,’
which the Obama Administration consistently refused to allow.”).
Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to state
Medicaid Dir. (Jan. 11, 2018) (available at Medicaid.gov).
Under the granted Kentucky waiver, caregiving for a person with a
“disabling medical condition” counts toward the community engagement
requirement. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Kentucky
Helping to Engage and Achieve Long Term Health (KY Health)
Approval Package, 32 (2018). It is not apparent whether and under what
circumstances Kentucky will include substance use disorder in this provision.
The ADA excludes those who are “currently engaging” in illegal drug use
from its definition of qualified individuals. That said, those in recovery
may be considered disabled depending whether the addiction is considered
a substantially limiting impairment. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, EEOCM1A, A Technical Assistance Manual on the
Employment Provisions (Title 1) of the Americans with
Disabilities Act §§ 8.2, 8.5 (1992); see Hartman v. City of Petaluma, 841 F.
Supp. 949, 949 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Sharing
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state requirements that have a blind spot for care work.
3. Inequality
Perhaps the main focus of the care work literature “has been
to highlight the undervaluation and gendered nature of care work.”74
Heavy reliance on care work—on family members’ uncompensated
efforts—often poses profound inequality concerns because of gender
imbalances in who performs this work. In short, “[c]aring labor
most frequently falls to women.”75 Research exploring the role of
family in fighting SUD should be attentive to identifying and perhaps
exploring the possibility that gender imbalances are endemic in this
area as they are in care work on child care.76
Furthermore, the nature of care work on SUD creates the
potential for a different form of inequality, in who benefits from
such work rather than who performs it. Many of the tasks that
family may assist with require cultural competence, time, and
organization. Finding treatment providers that take insurance is an
onerous task that—insofar as it entails navigating complex systems
and bureaucracies and interacting with numerous strangers on the
phone and in person—depends on cultural capital that may be less
available based on race, class, or country of origin.77 In the somewhat
related context of families’ abilities to advocate on behalf of children
with autism in seeking special education resources, Baldwin-Clark

74
75
76

77

the Dream: Is the ADA Accommodating All?, Chapter 4 (Oct. 2000), https://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/ada/ch4.htm.
Hoffman, supra note 6, at 172.
Silverman, supra note 4, at 6.
While not the purpose, design, or subject of the study, the fact that 78%
of family members not themselves reporting substance use who obtained
precautionary Naloxone access and training in Massachusetts were female in
Bagley’s study is consistent with the possibility of gender disparities in the
burden of care work on SUD. Bagley et al., supra note 32, at 151. In the future
researchers should consider designing such studies to develop insight into the
distribution of care work burdens.
See, e.g., Emily Corwin, Shortage Of Addiction Counselors Further Strained By
Opioid Epidemic, NPR: Shots (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2016/02/24/467143265/shortage-of-addiction-counselorsfurther-strained-by-opioid-epidemic; Binghui Huang, Medication could be key to
addiction recovery, but in the Lehigh Valley few doctors prescribe such treatment, The
Morning Call (May 4, 2018), http://www.mcall.com/business/health
care/mc-nws-nhclv-mat-program-20180129-story.html;
Beth
Leipholtz,
Shortage of Treatment Providers For Opioid Addiction Remains Issue For Many States,
The Fix (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.thefix.com/shortage-treatmentproviders-opioid-addiction-remains-issue-many-states.
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found precisely this sort of structural inequality.78
Access to health insurance coverage for SUD treatment and
services is a potential example of inequality of the benefits of care
work. Historically, mental health and addiction treatments and
services have been subject to coverage exclusions and especially
vigorous utilization review. The federal parity law seeks to counteract
this tendency, forbidding insurers from treating mental health and
addiction differently from other illnesses in coverage policies and
decision-making.79 But enforcement of this law is uneven, and many
advocates believe that access to addiction treatment is often barred
by inappropriate coverage limitations.80
Under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), all claimants who
seek and are denied coverage for a treatment or service by their
insurer have the right to appeal that decision both to the insurer
and to an independent, external reviewer.81 Available statistics show
that such appeals are successful as much as 40% of the time,82 so
appealing coverage denials is a promising way to overcome this
potential barrier to treatment.
All patients are not equally positioned to appeal, however.
Rather, a person’s functional ability to appeal an adverse coverage
decision depends on her awareness of the appeals process, her
cultural competence, her trust in institutions like the appeals process,
her free time (or ability to hire help) to devote to the appeal, and
so on.83 As scholars of civil procedure have long recognized, these
78

79
80

81
82

83

See generally Latoya Baldwin-Clark, Beyond Bias: Cultural Capital in AntiDiscrimination Law, 53 Harv. Civ. Rts-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 281 (2018)
(discussing sources on and describing racial and class-based disparities in
access to special education services, linking these disparities to underlying
disparities in cultural competence and capital in addition to bias).
29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2018).
See Valerie A. Canady, Ten States to Embark on New Campaign to Ensure Parity Lives
Up to its Promise, 27 Mental Health Weekly, Nov. 20, 2017, at 5; Alex
Gertner, Blue Cross Should Cover More Opioid Treatment, The News & Observer
(June 8, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article212771774.
html (“I called several . . . programs and was told that BCBS rarely pays for
this type of treatment.”).
See Katherine Vukadin, Hope or Hype?: Why the Affordable Care Act’s New External
Review Rules for Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 Buff. L.
Rev. 1201 (2012) (describing ACA rules).
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-268, Private Health
Insurance: Data on Application and Coverage Denials 22, 23
(2011) (finding that appeals were successful in reversing coverage denial 39
to 59% of the time).
Baldwin-Clark, supra note 78, at n.27.
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variables can be correlated with income, education, age, race, and
class, among other variables.84 Thus, our “system” for ensuring the
accuracy of insurance coverage determinations may entail differential
treatment, providing more “accurate” (however defined) favorable
coverage determinations to those whose family connections have
the capacity and wherewithal to appeal.
IV. Addressing Social Consequences
Whatever their theoretical relevance, actually measuring
social consequences like interference, invisibility, and inequality
and weighing them against more easily ascertained impacts—in
particular medical impacts—is hard to do, as discussed in Part A. This
“knowledge problem” is a reason to invest in evaluation and research
that is open to social consequences when implementing new laws
that deputize family, as Part B illustrates with the case of involuntary
treatment laws. Moreover, the “break-even” analysis approach used
to incorporate hard-to-quantify variables in administrative law
cost-benefit analysis provides a framework for assessing laws that
deputize family, as discussed in Part C. And that framework can
and should be employed to evaluate the wisdom of a legal change
from a welfare economic perspective, as Part D’s discussion of the
choice architecture of consent to disclosure of protected information
related to SUD treatment demonstrates.
A. Health, Love, and Knowledge
Incorporating the problems of interference, invisibility, and
inequality in crafting laws that regulate health (or other behaviors) is
challenging, in two ways. First is the problem of measurement, that
is, of predicting how likely a legal change is to influence a behavior
that it might theoretically influence.
Measurement is a particular problem for assessing
interference with family relationships.85 It is difficult enough to
predict and measure the medical impact of a law that operates
84
85

Marc Galanter is generally cited as the origin of this insight about the nature
of procedural rules. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc’y Rev. 95 (1974).
As for invisibility and inequality, observing unseen labor and identifying
disparities in the provision or availability of such unobserved labor pose
challenges of their own, though when it comes to measurement these
challenges are not as imposing as those for measuring interference. The
more policymakers bring care work into the visible realm, the more it will be
possible to assess inequality in its burdens and benefits.
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through third parties such as family members, even though health
is a concrete and relatively measurable outcome.86 Assessing the
impact of such a law on the formation of caring relationships is
much harder. While a promising history of scholarship seeks to track
family relationships,87 such relationships are not as readily measured
as health status indicators or health outcomes. Moreover, measuring
the causal effect of law on such relationships is complicated by the
fact that such effects are unlikely to be instantaneous, necessitating
long-term observation.88 While it is possible and desirable that
researchers might combine scholarship tracking family relationships
with scholarship tracking the effect of law on behavior,89 such work
is not readily available.90 In short, interference impacts are difficult
86

87
88

89

90

See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 20, at 12
(explaining that “federally funded research into substance abuse treatment
has focused on . . . individual-specific treatments” in part because “research
with families is difficult and costly”); Simons et al., supra note 28, at 2
(“Methodological limitations and challenges associated with implementing
family interventions in treatment settings may contribute to the mixed
findings about the effectiveness of family components for adult substance
abusers.”).
E.g. Susan M. McHale et al., Sibling Relationships and Influences in Childhood and
Adolescence, 74 J. Marriage & Fam. 913 (2012); Clare M. Stocker et al.,
Sibling Relationships in Early Adulthood, 11 J. Fam. Psychol. 210 (1997).
The positive impacts of an intervention in this space may flow directly from
the intervention itself and so be direct and immediate; for example, any
benefit associated with involuntary treatment for the patient is immediately
observable in the patient themselves and comes straight from the intervention.
But upstream (or downstream, depending on one’s point of view) behavioral
impacts of such interventions may be largely a function of the incorporation
of knowledge of the rule into public awareness. In order for a bystander’s
decision whether to call for help when a friend overdoses to be influenced
by “immunity” laws, she must know about those laws, so too, in order for a
patient to avoid family for fear of involuntary treatment she must know about
involuntary treatment laws. Such long-run behavioral impacts will presumably
take time and widespread adoption and implementation (or education) to
develop, so it will be very difficult to pick up in a typical study population.
See D. James Greiner & Andrea Matthews, Randomized Control Trials in the United
States Legal Profession, 12 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 295 (2016) (discussing
the usefulness of incorporating randomized control trials into the legal
profession).
Researchers might use the fact that a person must know about a law for
it to affect her behavior to measure interference with family relationships.
Specifically, researchers might consider randomizing disclosures to patients
about particular laws in their state—such as involuntary treatment laws,
civil forfeiture laws, or immunity laws—in order to assess any differential
downstream behavioral implications for family relationships, consistent of
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to measure and predict.
A related problem for incorporating social consequences is
that of quantification, that is, of converting a particular concern into
terms by which it might be weighed against traditionally financial or
medical impacts. This quantification challenge is a particular problem
for inequality, which is recognized as difficult- if not impossible-toquantify.91 Some have argued that it would be better to have an equal
system than an unequal one so, 92 for example, we should not have
an appeals process for insurance coverage decisions at all unless we
can design one that is equally accessible in practice to all and so does
not exacerbate inequality. Tradeoffs that permit unequal treatment
of anyone, or of any vulnerable group, may simply be intolerable and
not susceptible to quantification and comparison with more fungible
values.
On the other hand, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that
rather than incorporate some distributional considerations in
regulatory design, regulators should design the optimal regulatory
apparatus, then somehow repay or offset any inequities through taxes
or subsidies for those subject to them. It is possible to envision this
approach being used to better account for inequality in consequential
analysis of deputization; the value of unpaid labor (and hypothetical
cost of repaying those who perform it) might be used to quantify
unequal distribution of burdens, and the value of assistance (and
hypothetical cost to provide it through state-sponsored navigators
or other supports) might be used to quantify unequal distribution
of benefits.93
In any event, the fact of measurement and quantification
challenges in assessing social consequences like interference,
invisibility, and inequality does not mean that such consequences do
not exist or that scholars or policymakers should not consider them
in weighing laws or reforms.94 To the contrary, this quantification
91
92
93
94

course with governing ethical requirements and IRB approval.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life (2014) (discussing the difficulty of
quantifying human dignity).
See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare (2006) (discussing such arguments).
See id. (making such an argument).
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 122 (2016) (“The
problem with this argument [that difficult-to-quantify values should be
ignored] is that the zero probability is even more arbitrary than the regulator’s
prior.”).
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challenge creates a risk that such impacts will be ignored, and so
a danger that policymakers will adopt policies that appear to be
beneficial or at least neutral in the short-term data capable of and
subject to measurement, like impact on a particular patient’s health,
even while being problematic or counter-productive overall or in the
long run.95
B. The Need for Research into the Social Consequences of
Deputization: The Case of Involuntary Treatment Laws
Consideration of the risk of interference, invisibility,
and inequality in deputization—the “social consequences” of
deputization—can, even in the face of the knowledge problem
discussed above, reveal the need for and guide further research
before concluding that a policy is beneficial. Indeed, fear that efforts
to regulate family will ultimately backfire is one of the reasons for
the “[t]radition of [n]oninterference” in family law.96 In other words,
the possibility of social consequences can at a minimum provide a
reason for restraint before concluding that any particular reform that
deputizes family is desirable, or for including in such laws provisions
to ensure the development of better information regarding their full
range of impacts and revisitation as necessary. Involuntary treatment
laws offer an example of such a reform as to which there is enough
reason for concern about social consequences to justify continuing
research.
A growing body of state legislative reforms empower family
members to petition to have their loved ones sent for involuntary
treatment. Such laws generally empower family or doctors to ask a
court to force a person into treatment for SUD on the ground that
the disorder creates a “likelihood of serious harm.”97 Pennsylvania’s
proposed statute is illustrative: it would empower a “spouse,
guardian, or relative” to bring a petition.98
The claim that such laws actually carry a benefit in terms of
health is dubious. For example, Beletsky and Ryan survey concerns
with these laws, noting that voluntary treatment is more effective
95
96
97
98

See Sunstein, supra note 91; Masur & Posner, supra note 94.
See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1837 (1985) (“The law not only suspects that
intervention will do harm; it doubts that intervention will do good . . . .”).
Beletsky & Ryan, supra note 47 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws c. 123, § 35 (2018));
see also id. (describing 33 related state laws).
S. 391, 2017−18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); Bhalla et al., supra note 47, at 2.
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than involuntary treatment, particularly for those with mental
illness or other health needs and that involuntary treatment passes
costs from insurers to the state.99 Along the same lines, Bhalla and
co-authors express doubts about the medical consequences of these
laws and also express ethical objections.100
Such laws may also have social consequences that weigh
against their adoption. In theory, empowering family members to
force their loved ones into involuntary commitment could raise
precisely the same concern that motivates the spousal privilege
and the enhanced privacy protection provided to SUD treatmentrelated medical information, namely, concern about chilling
communication.101 If awareness and utilization of such laws were
widespread, they could theoretically discourage those with SUD
from disclosing the extent of their addiction to loved ones, disclosing
their location to loved ones, acknowledging a relapse to loved ones,
and so on, for fear that such information would prompt and/or be
used against them in an involuntary treatment proceeding.102
This potential concern is connected to the fact that in many
states, involuntary treatment laws not only explicitly limit the class
of petitioners to family, but also make information the family might
have gleaned from their loved one the primary focus of the court’s
decision whether to order the patient into treatment. For example,
Pennsylvania’s proposed involuntary treatment law requires the
petition assert:
The petitioner’s belief, including the factual basis for the
belief, that the respondent is suffering from alcohol
and other drug abuse and presents an imminent
See Beletsky & Ryan, supra note 47; see also Leo Beletsky et al., Expanding Coercive
Treatment is the Wrong Solution for the Opioid Crisis, Health Aff.: Health
Aff. Blog (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160211.053127/full/ (making similar finding).
100 See Bhalla et al., supra note 47 (offering survey of medical and ethical objections
to civil commitment).
101 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052,
6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2)(The spousal privilege
is motivated by a desire to encourage communication between spouses,
enhanced privacy for SUD medical information by a desire to encourage
communication with providers.).
102 Cf. Why I Abandoned Tough Love Instead of My Child, Woman’s Day (July 1,
2016), https://www.womansday.com/health-fitness/wellness/a55379/helpfor-parents-of-drug-addicts/ (discussing one mother’s perspective that her
prior “tough love” approach had interfered with her son’s efforts at recovery).
99
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danger or imminent threat of danger to self, family or
others, or that there exists a substantial likelihood of
such a threat in the near future, if the respondent is
not treated for alcohol or other drug abuse.103
Accordingly, to someone who does not wish to pursue
treatment, family in a state with an involuntary treatment law could
theoretically present a double threat: the law directly empowers
the family member to petition to force the patient into involuntary
treatment, and the law makes whatever information the family
member might have learned from his loved one central to the court’s
willingness to initiate involuntary treatment proceedings. This
poses the risk of twin chills: first, against one’s willingness to even
tell family that they may have SUD or, if they know, inform family
of their location; and second, against one’s willingness to disclose
details of their addiction to family for fear those details might be
used against them.
Involuntary treatment laws also may pose invisibility and
inequality concerns. Family usually must pay for the treatment
received, and going through the petition process poses significant
logistical and emotional burdens for family, who are of course not
paid for their efforts. As for inequality, as a means to identify and
push into treatment those who need it such laws pose a real risk
of disparities: as discussed above, civil procedure scholars have
observed in other contexts that the meaningfulness of such an opt-in
procedural mechanism can vary significantly across the population.
To be sure, these are only potential, theoretical concerns
about the possible social consequences of involuntary treatment
laws. It may be that involuntary treatment laws have no impact on
underlying family relationships currently and would still have no
impact even if their existence became both widespread and widely
known. On the other hand, it is accepted that fear of being subject to
law enforcement discourages bystanders from calling for help when
a friend overdoses; this is the behavioral rationale for immunity
laws.104 It is an open question whether the same sort of fear would
tend to discourage a person who is aware that a loved one might
initiate involuntary treatment proceedings from informing that
103 S. 391, 2017−18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017)(emphasis added).
104 See Corey Davis et al., Changing Law from Barrier to Facilitator of Opioid Overdose
Prevention, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics 33, 34 (2013) (discussing need “to
encourage bystanders to summon emergency responders” behind such laws).
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loved one of her illness, relapse, or location.
This concern about potential interference does not shed any
additional light on the acute health impacts of involuntary treatment
on the treated individual. However, it adds the following macro-level
caution for further inquiry: such deputization mechanisms may alter
the power dynamics within a family and so their widespread adoption
and use may change family behaviors broadly. Moreover, any benefits
and burdens they create are unpaid and may be distributed unfairly.
It is important that legislators and policymakers investigate and
assess such possible detrimental impacts on the family’s ability to
improve health, reduce mortality, improve access, and aid in recovery
in considering if any hypothetical benefits for access to treatment in
an individual case are worthwhile. Moreover, where policymakers
prefer to enact legislation despite uncertainty, they should include
in such legislation provisions facilitating information gathering and
policy re-assessment, such as providing funding for an agency report
upon the health and social consequences of the law.105
This is not to say that gleaning quality information about
social consequences by tracking a reform’s effects would be easy.
Assessing the impact of a state policy change never is.106 But while
perfect information may be unattainable, laws and studies can be
designed to provide helpful information and, so, facilitate better
policy.107
C. Accounting for the Social Consequences of Deputization
with Break-Even Analysis
No amount of feasible research will remove all uncertainty
surrounding the social consequences of deputization. Extensive
literature in administrative law on the theory and practice of costbenefit analysis, however, discusses how policymakers can and
should incorporate uncertain costs and benefits into their decisionmaking.108 This scholarship on the theory and practice of “cost105 C.f. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1946, 124 Stat. 119, 582 (2010) (mandating Secretary of HHS to evaluate
data collection regarding health disparities and submit report to Congress
recommending ways to improve such data collection).
106 See Kristin Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting
Health System Experimentation, 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 765, 777−83 (2014)
(discussing impediments to such knowledge gathering).
107 For general discussion of the construction of reforms to encourage knowledge
development, see id. at 784 n.84.
108 E.g., Sunstein, supra note 91; Masur & Posner, supra note 94; Amy Sinden,
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benefit analysis” discusses how administrative agencies should make
evidence-informed decisions about hard-to-quantify or qualitative
considerations. The insights of this line of scholarship can be applied
to incorporate the social consequences of deputization as well.
Specifically, “break-even analysis” is a normative framework
for decision-making in the face of hard-to-quantify costs or benefits.109
This is an approach cost-benefit scholars and policymakers employ
when, as occurs “[m]uch of the time, we cannot quantify the benefits
of potential courses of action, or the costs, or both, and we must
nonetheless decide whether and how to proceed.”110 In essence,
breakeven analysis “quantifies what can be quantified, acknowledges
what cannot, and adopts a specific framework to help regulators
decide how to proceed in the way of limited information.”111 In
practice, it entails establishing reasonable upper and/or lower
“bounds” as thresholds that benefits would have to reach to be
justified (or that costs would have to reach to counsel caution), then
utilizes all available evidence to estimate whether the benefits (or
costs) are sufficient to meet that threshold.112 In short, break-even
analysis simply dictates that “when an agency faces uncertainty, it
should ask itself, ‘how small could the value of the non-quantified
benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified costs
need to be) before the rule would yield zero net benefits.’”113
None of this is to say that policymaking should not be
evidence based; it’s quite the opposite. Break-even analysis provides
a framework through which policymaking can be more informed by
evidence and also helps in determining where and how evidence
should be developed.
D. Application: The Choice Architecture of Disclosure to and
by Family
Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 93 (2015).
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1369 (2014).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1385−87 (illustrating the factors of break-even analysis and
unquantifiable factors in analysis). See also Pranav Kumar Choudhary et al.,
Break-Even Analysis in Healthcare Setup, 1 Int’l J. of Res. Found. Hosp. &
Healthcare Admin. 29, 30–32 (2013) (describing break-even analysis in the
healthcare world).
113 Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (quoting Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 2 (2003)).
109
110
111
112
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This subpart demonstrates how the above framework can
be used to evaluate and demonstrate the desirability of laws that
deputize family in health care, weighing and comparing health
impacts with social impacts including interference, invisibility, and
inequality. It does so by evaluating two potential changes to the
choice architecture of privacy deputization for disclosure of SUD
information: an active choice approach (as compared to an opt-in or
opt-out approach) and supported decision-making.
Private information pertaining to SUD treatment is protected
from disclosure by both HIPAA and 42 C.F.R. Part 2, itself a
creature of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. This protection restricts applicable
providers’ ability to share medical information with those other
than the patient. The Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and the President’s Commission have each recognized that
misunderstandings about HIPAA can lead to “obstacles to family
support that [are] crucial to the proper care and treatment” of SUD
sufferers.114
While restricting disclosure of SUD treatment information
carries a downside when it prevents a doctor from informing a family
member that the patient would like informed, it carries a significant
benefit when the promise of privacy encourages a person to come
forward and seek treatment for SUD despite the heavy stigma
surrounding the illness. The judgment—not questioned here—
that the benefits of privacy under current requirements outweigh
the associated costs is reflected in the statutory and regulatory
protection currently afforded under HIPAA and Part 2.
This subpart focuses on a discrete but nonetheless important
aspect of the experience of privacy for SUD patients distinct from
the privacy requirements themselves: the choice architecture of
deputization. As discussed in subsection 1, below, both HIPAA and
Part 2 permit patients to authorize disclosures to family members,
that is, to deputize family as eligible recipients of protected medical
information. Yet the “choice architecture” of such deputization—
how and when patients may enlist (or recognize) the help of family
114 HHS Offices fo r Ci vil Ri ghts Is sues Gu idance on Ho w HIPAA Al lows Information
Sharing to Address the Opioid Crisis, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/27/hhs-officecivil-rights-issues-guidance-how-hipaa-allows-info-sharing-address-opioidcrisis.html. Commission Report, supra note 36, at 122 (noting 42 C.F.R.
Part 2 as a barrier and modification to that regulation “to permit the sharing
of this type of information among health care providers and the loved ones of
those suffering from SUDs”).
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in navigating their treatment by authorizing disclosure to them—
varies significantly between HIPAA and Part 2.
1. Choice Architecture of Deputization for SUD Disclosures
HIPAA applies broadly to medical providers to limit the
disclosure of protected health information.115 HIPAA’s privacy
protections are a creature of privacy regulations promulgated by HHS
under a broad delegation of statutory authority, and so all aspects
of these protections can be changed through the administrative
process.116
Because of concern that SUD sufferers avoid treatment for
fear of their illness being exposed to employers, family, or others,
Part 2 offers additional protections for the disclosure of protected
health information collected by certain SUD treatment providers.117
Part 2 is largely a creature of regulation that can be changed through
the administrative process, but the underlying statutory delegation
is not as broad and so constrains both the breadth of the agency’s
discretion to alter the rules through the administrative process and
the scope of the agency’s permissible authority.118
Current HIPAA and Part 2 rules permit patients to deputize
family, empowering them to receive protected information or even
consent to additional disclosures.119 The manner and context of such
115 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a)(1)−(3) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2018); 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.502 (2018).
116 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104−191, 110 Stat. 1936; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a) (2018).
117 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg.
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The laws and
regulations governing the confidentiality of substance use disorder records
were written out of great concern about the potential use of substance use
disorder information against individuals, causing individuals with substance
use disorders not to seek needed treatment. The disclosure of records of
individuals with substance use disorder has the potential to lead to a host of
negative consequences, including: Loss of employment, loss of housing, loss
of child custody, discrimination by medical professionals and insurers, arrest,
prosecution, and incarceration.”).
118 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1992) (amended 1998).
119 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2018); 45 C.F.R. 164.510(b) (2018); 42 C.F.R.
2.31 (2018); Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, Guidance: Personal
Representatives, Health Information Privacy (Sept. 19, 2003), https://www.
hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/personal-representatives/
index.html; Elizabeth Snell, Do HIPAA Regulations Need Updates on Patient
Privacy?, Health IT Security (Aug. 15, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.
com/news/do-hipaa-regulations-need-updates-on-patient-privacy.
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deputization differs markedly between the programs, however.
When it comes to family involved in a patient’s treatment,
HIPAA generally leaves it to providers to decide case-by-case whether
the patient’s consent to disclosure should be opt-in or opt-out and
how opt-in or opt-out should occur.120 In other words, providers
choose whether and how to seek patients’ input about consenting to
disclosure to family—at the start of treatment, the end, verbally, in
writing, explicitly, implicitly, etc. HHS did not discuss the decision
to leave this choice architecture to the discretion of providers at
length in the privacy rule but did explain that this approach permits
providers to use their medical judgment about the best course.121
Part 2, on the other hand, makes deputization opt-in. A
patient must affirmatively agree to disclosure in writing, and this
agreement must satisfy certain regulatory criteria for duration,
specificity, and so on.122 Consistent with the underlying concern
about encouraging patients with SUD to seek treatment without
fear of discovery or embarrassment given societal stigma, this makes
the default presumption one of non-disclosure to friends and family,
i.e., of isolation.
Turning to the scope of deputization, HIPAA allows patients
to empower their family or friends to permit further disclosures
under very limited circumstances.123 Specifically, if a patient has
granted authority to “mak[e] decisions related to health care” to
another, then that deputy is also authorized under HIPAA to permit
disclosures of protected information, for example, to an additional
provider.124 The regulations do not permit patients to empower a
loved one to authorize such disclosures without taking the further
step of also empowering the loved one to make medical decisions.
The scope of deputization under Part 2 is even more limited.
A patient can only empower another to help coordinate her care by
authorizing disclosure or re-disclosure by making that person her
legal guardian. Moreover, the regulations include a requirement,
120 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (a)(2) (2018) (provider can either seek patient’s
affirmative consent or disclose when patient does not take advantage of an
“opportunity to object” provided that such disclosure is within the patient’s
best interest and consistent with any prior expressed preference he or she may
have).
121 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82462, 82664 (Dec. 28, 2000).
122 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (2018).
123 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(2) (2018).
124 Id.
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not included in the statute, prohibiting re-disclosure of protected
information by its recipient.125
2. The Preferability of Break-Even Analysis over HHS’s
Regulatory Approach
HHS substantially revised Part 2 in 2017.126 The agency
focused exclusively on operational costs of changes to the rule in
its Regulatory Impact Analysis, as if Part 2 did not have important
impacts on the health of SUD sufferers as well.127 This is in contrast
to the effort of other agencies to pull apart and carefully consider even
uncertain benefits and costs in rulemaking.128 This is characteristic
of HHS, however; a recent study of the use of cost-benefit analysis
in rulemaking showed HHS as the agency that most frequently failed
to engage in cost-benefit analysis ostensibly called for by Executive
Order.129
It would have been preferable for HHS to engage in some form
of cost-benefit analysis, perhaps including break-even analysis, that
grappled with the various costs and benefits of Part 2 as they related
to the revised rule, for four reasons. First, Part 2 implicates a host of
important considerations and analysis of these considerations would
reduce the likelihood that current rules might fail to accurately
balance them.
Foremost, of course, is the benefit that protecting the privacy
of SUD treatment information may encourage individuals to seek
treatment who would otherwise fear adverse consequences from
unwanted disclosure to employers, law enforcement, loved ones,
125 Compare 42 C.F.R. § 2.32 (2018) (prohibition on re-disclosure), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 290dd-2(a) (1992) (amended 1998) (limiting disclosures by treatment
providers).
126 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052
(Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).
127 Id. at 6109 (“When estimating the total costs associated with changes to the
42 C.F.R. part 2 regulations, we assumed five sets of costs: updates to health
IT systems costs, costs for staff training and updates to training curriculum,
costs to update patient consent forms, costs associated with providing patients
a list of entities to which their information has been disclosed pursuant to
a general designation on the consent form . . . and implementation costs
associated with the List of Disclosures requirements.”).
128 See generally Sunstein, supra note 91 (discussing such efforts); Masur &
Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (same).
129 Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 124 (describing the HHS as “dominat[ing]”
list of agencies that produced regulations for which “either benefits or costs
(or both) were not quantified at all).
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and so on. HHS mentioned this motivating benefit of Part 2 in the
preamble to its rule.130
While encouraging patients to seek treatment is paramount,
a countervailing concern is that Part 2 imposes a cost by making
coordination among providers more difficult.131 Again HHS
mentioned this countervailing cost of Part 2 in the preamble
to its rule in describing the underlying protection, but did not
either quantify or purport to weigh it in relation to its proposed
revision, despite emphasizing the importance of balancing it with
the access-promoting purposes of Part 2.132 Moreover, various
commentators have identified, implicitly or explicitly, additional
considerations: Part 2 helps lower the likelihood of employment, law
enforcement, custody, or other discrimination on the basis of SUD.
Such discrimination can be intrinsically bad above and beyond its
relationship to chilling treatment and associated health impacts.133
And Part 2 makes it harder for law enforcement to identify and
prosecute those with SUD to the extent their SUD brings illegal
activity; some believe that such law enforcement activity can itself
be harmful rather than helpful for a variety of reasons and on that
view any policy change that makes it easier as a cost rather than a

130 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg.
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The laws and
regulations . . . were written out of great concern about . . . causing individuals
with substance use disorders not to seek needed treatment.”).
131 See Jennifer K. Manuel et al., Confidentiality Protections Versus Collaborative Care
in the Treatment of Substance Use Disorders, 8 Addiction Sci. Clinical Prac.
13 (2013).
132 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052,
6077 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“With respect to
obstacles to information sharing, one of SAMHSA’s goals for this rulemaking
is to ensure that patients with substance use disorders have the ability to
participate in and benefit from new integrated health care models without
fear of putting themselves at risk of adverse consequences.”); id. at 6089
(“SAMHSA acknowledges the legitimate concerns of commenters regarding
how care coordination relates to patient safety. However, SAMHSA must
consider the intent of the governing statute [], which is to protect the
confidentiality of substance use disorder patient records.”).
133 See, e.g., Karla Lopez & Deborah Reid, Discrimination Against Patients with
Substance Use Disorders Remains Prevalent and Harmful: The Case for 42 C.F.R. Part
2, Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (Apr. 13, 2017) (“The confidentiality
law is often the only shield between an individual in recovery from addiction
and the many forms of discrimination and prejudice that could destroy their
lives.”).
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benefit.134
Second, a more fulsome analysis explaining whether and why
the agency’s experts saw chilling concerns as outweighing medical
coordination benefits from loosening Part 2 would go further toward
persuading proponents of medical coordination that HHS had struck
the right balance. Numerous provider groups support changes to
Part 2, presenting the law as an “outdated” barrier to information
sharing among providers.135 A fuller explanation of costs and benefits
of these changes from HHS might persuade proponents they are not
worthwhile, and would provide a greater foundation upon which any
future Congressional consideration could be built to be sure that
Congress does not miss tradeoffs, predictions, or valuations that
might have been implicit but unarticulated in HHS’s rulemaking.
Third, even when costs and benefits are inevitably uncertain,
teasing them out to the extent possible in a systemic way facilitates
subsequent research and revisitation of crucial policy assumptions.
As will be discussed at greater length below, a strength of breakeven analysis is that it helps to pinpoint questions on which further
research might be both possible and determinative, and so encourages
regulators continually to reassess policies as new information comes
to light.136
Fourth, a break-even analysis would increase the likelihood
that the agency identified and considered viable alternatives and
tweaks to its chosen approach.137 The following sections will
illustrate this with regard to the consent provisions of the rule.
All that said, cost-benefit analysis of the Part 2 rule would
not have been without downsides. Paramount, perhaps, is the risk
of overestimating costs of Part 2 and underestimating benefits.
The costs of Part 2—interfering with care coordination—are highly
visible to health care providers. Its benefits, however—an increased
likelihood that patients will seek treatment—are not as visible.
134 See id. (describing “arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating people because of
their illness” as a cause of stigma surrounding SUD).
135 See generally Partnership to Amend 42 CFR Part 2, www.
helpendopioidcrisis.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
136 See Masur & Posner, supra note 94, at 126 (noting that “[t]his review of priors
could take place as part of the broader retrospective review of regulations”).
137 For example, “[s]everal commenters expressed concerns that the prohibition
on re-disclosure did not improve patient privacy protections,” Confidentiality
of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052, 6090 (Jan.
18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2), but HHS did not respond to that
comment or explain why it disagreed.
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Providers are plainly much less likely to encounter people who were
deterred from seeking treatment by fear of disclosure; relatedly, the
population of people that providers do meet are likely to be those
for whom fear of disclosure did not wind up being determinative.
And providers themselves experience the inconvenience and harms
of Part 2 to the extent that it limits coordination. As such, a large,
well-informed and connected constituency for Part 2 may tend to
underestimate the benefits of Part 2 and overestimate its costs.138
This presents the risk that this bias would infect break-even analysis
as well.
Concern that some benefits or costs may be overemphasized
is a reason to be careful in engaging in break-even analysis, or even to
endorse a presumption in such analysis in favor of the likely-underexposed value. It is not, however, a reason to refuse to admit the
possibility that the value might not be worthwhile in some cases or
to explain analytically how and why benefits of a rule outweigh the
costs. Indeed, that approach might be counterproductive because,
as explained above, it could lead to the propagation through the
administrative process of a suboptimally tailored rule that lacks the
support of a large constituency.
3. Break-Even Analysis Indicates that Providers Should
Be Encouraged to Offer an Active Choice About Part 2
Consent
Of course, performing the break-even analysis that was lacking
from HHS’s revision of Part 2 is beyond the scope of this Article. This
section’s focus is instead on the more narrow question of how family
are deputized as able to receive and authorize disclosure of a person’s
otherwise protected medical information. Break-even analysis of the
first question—how family are deputized as able to receive a loved
one’s protected information under Part 2—reveals that providers
should be encouraged to present patients with an “active choice”
about such deputization. Rather than make non-disclosure the
assumed, default option, providers should affirmatively ask patients
in each case whether they would like to identify one or more loved
ones as able to obtain their health information.
As discussed above, HIPAA does not mandate a single default
rule for permitting disclosure of protected medical information to
patients’ friends or family. Instead, the current privacy rule leaves
138 See Sunstein, supra note 91 (discussing such bias).
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it to doctors to use their judgment to decide whether to employ an
opt-in or opt-out approach or, indeed, to decide whether to present
the choice at all. This makes HIPAA’s privacy rule an example of a
“tailored default”139 in which the determination of the default is left
to the provider.
The choice architecture of Part 2 consent is in some sense a
tailored default as well, except that doctors do not have the option
of making consent “opt-out” when it comes to SUD information
protected by Part 2 as they do when it comes to HIPAA. 140 Specifically,
Part 2 requires a detailed, written consent form.141
The default rule for consent is important because default
rules can be a powerful influence on decision-making; in organ
donation, studies have shown the default determining a person’s
choice approximately 16%–22% of the time.142 Defaults stick for
several reasons: some individuals see defaults as communicating
policymakers (or doctors’) judgment about the “best” option for
them, and so take the default as a signal of the preferred approach.143
Others follow the default due to the decisional burden of departing
from it—not making a choice is easier than making a choice,
especially when making the choice requires involved steps.144 And
finally, due to the “endowment effect,” some value the default state
of affairs more highly simply because it is the default.145
This “status quo bias” can be avoided using an “active choice”
approach in which decision-makers are forced to decide one way
139 For an explanation of tailored defaults, see Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 1417,
1420−27 (2014) (discussing advantages of personalized default rules).
140 See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
Fla. St. L. Rev. 651 (2006).
141 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(a) (2018).
142 See Kendrick T. Van Dalen & Kène Henkens, Comparing the Effects of Defaults
in Organ Donation Systems, 106 Soc. Sci. & Med. 137, 139 (2014) (reporting
opt-in rate of 50% to organ donation as compared to 66% participation rate
under active choice regime in survey-based study); Richard H. Thaler, Opting
In vs. Opting Out, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2009, at BU6 (reporting 60% organ
donation participation rate in Illinois under active choice regime, as compared
to 38% rate nationally); Stan Dorn et al., Making Health Insurance Enrollment
as Automatic as Possible (Part 1), Health Aff.: Health Aff. Blog (May 2,
2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180501.141197/
full/.
143 See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 115−16 (collecting sources addressing reasons
defaults stick).
144 Id.
145 Id.
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or the other, without a default option. An active choice approach
avoids signaling one option as the “best one” and neutralizes the
endowment effect, potential benefits bought at the “price” of forcing
the decisional burden of making a choice on everyone.146 In short,
active choice deprives people of the freedom not to decide, but frees
their decision of the encumbrances of a perhaps undesired signal
about the “best” option and the endowment effect.147
Is it right to leave providers on their own in deciding whether
to make consent to Part 2 disclosure “opt-in” or instead to present
patients with an “active choice” about such disclosure?
Health: From the perspective of patient health, it is not clear
that one or the other (opt-in or active choice) is preferable. The
health concern underlying privacy protection for such information is
that the threat of unwanted disclosures would deter someone from
seeking treatment.148 But it is not apparent that asking a person
affirmatively to decide whether to permit disclosure to a loved one or
not would increase or decrease this threat. Indeed, Part 2 regulations
require an early notice be given to patients regarding protections;
inquiring about consent at the same time might helpfully underscore
that the patient’s information is private if she wants it to be. In other
words, concern that the threat of disclosure will discourage patients
from seeking medical care in the first place is a reason not to disclose
private information without the patient’s consent, not a reason to
choose a default of non-disclosure over an active choice regime. In
either case medical information is disclosed only with the patient’s
consent.
Interference: In contrast to health impacts, active choice has
several potential social benefits over an opt-in regime. First, to the
extent that people follow the status quo because they perceive it as a
signal of the preferred alternative by policymakers,149 an opt-in regime
146 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 39−43
(2013) (discussing arguments in favor of active choosing).
147 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword to Nudging Health, at xi (Glenn Cohen et
al. eds., 2016).
148 See Paul N. Samuels & Patty McCarthy Metcalf, Relaxing Patient Privacy
Rules Would Worsen the Opioid Epidemic, Stat (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.
statnews.com/2017/11/24/opioid-epidemic-patient-privacy/
(arguing
based on logic that Part 2 privacy protections significantly increase patients’
willingness to seek treatment such that relaxing such protections would cause
“immeasurable and immediate” harm).
149 See John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in Social Security Policy in a
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signals that policymakers see going it alone as the best course. But
research indicates that, quite the contrary, involving family in care
is a positive.150 Accordingly, an opt-in approach may send the wrong
signal and an active choice regime would be a preferable alternative
because it would avoid sending any signal at all.
Invisibility: Second, as to invisibility, an opt-in regime creates
a significant risk that due to lack of awareness or inertia, a person
whose loved ones are actively involved in her care will simply not
go through the trouble of signing (or be unaware they can sign) a
consent to permit her provider to disclose information to the loved
one. Indeed, HHS encourages this common work-around.151 In such
a case, the patient may simply communicate protected information
to the loved one herself. While this is a lawful workaround and may
be a functional one as well, it increases the likelihood that the role
of family in assisting with a person’s treatment will go unobserved
by policymakers or providers.
Moreover, this invisible workaround for informing loved ones
involved in a SUD patient’s care creates the risk of an additional
adverse health impact of an opt-in regime. Even closely involved
family may then be cut off from pivotal information if for any reason,
such as a relapse, their loved one becomes unavailable to share
information themselves. In such a case, the loved one who has been
serving as a navigator and the provider themselves would be unable
to collaborate, simply because they did not take the preemptive step
of getting a consent on file when they had the chance due to an optin regime.
Inequality: Finally, inequality favors active choice because the
effect of a default is not the same for all influenced by it.152 A wellinformed patient or family member with experience or competence
Changing Environment 167 (Jeffery R. Brown et al. eds., 2009).
150 See supra Part II.A.
151 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052,
6070 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“[I]t is permissible
[under part 2] for a patient to disclose information to a personal health record
or similar consumer application but if a part 2 program or lawful holder of
patient identifying information discloses that information to the personal
health record or similar consumer application on behalf of the patient, consent
would be required.”).
152 See Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging,
116 Mich. L. Rev. 1045, 1055 (2018) (“[N]udges do not work equally well
for all citizens . . . .”); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 115−17 (discussing “status
quo bias as a sifting mechanism” based on predictable variation among the
population in the stickiness of defaults).
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navigating complicated health care regimes is relatively better able
and more likely to learn of and find ways to overcome a default rule.
In concrete terms, this means that a person’s ability to authorize
a family member to discuss treatment options with his doctor
depends on her cultural capital, educational, and competing decision
burdens. So, the goal of equal treatment favors fewer burdens and
active choice.
Weighing: As compared to an opt-in regime, active choice
about disclosure of protected SUD treatment information to loved
ones involved in a person’s care carries a reduced risk of interference
with family relationships, makes care work more visible, reduces
inequality inherent in an opt-in system, and has potential health
benefits. It therefore appears to be the preferable way to present
patients with the question of whether to consent to disclosure of
their protected SUD information to loved ones.
Moreover, leaving providers with the unguided decision of
whether and when to present an active choice about consent risks
that they will not do so often enough. By training and by perspective,
providers are positioned to focus on medical effects. This creates a
risk that providers will tend to give too little weight to systemic,
social consequences that are both beyond their expertise and beyond
their immediate view.
Accordingly, regulators should at a minimum consider
issuing guidance encouraging providers to present patients with an
active choice about disclosure to loved ones as a matter of course
unless they perceive some concern that counsels against doing so.
Such guidance might also suggest logistics for when and how to ask
patients to make this choice.
Moreover, it might be that any health benefits of allowing
providers to decline to present patients with a choice about
deputization are outweighed by the costs of this “tailored default”
approach. This question should be explored further and, with it, the
possibility of mandating rather than merely encouraging providers
to present an active choice about consenting to disclosure of SUD
information to loved ones in all cases.153
153 Recently enacted federal legislation explicitly empowers family caregivers
and requires that they be given support and resources. But this legislation
was motivated by proponents of long-term care for the elderly, and so is
triggered only upon a patient’s discharge from inpatient treatment at the
hospital. H.B. 1329, 199th Gen. Assemb., 2015−16 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016)
(Caregiver Advise, Record, and Enable Act allows for a patient to choose their
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4. Break-Even Analysis Indicates that Permitting
Supported Decision-Making for Part 2 Consent is a Difficult
Judgment Call
In addition to pointing to reforms that are desirable (or
undesirable), inclusion of social consequences in break-even analysis
can promote understanding of laws that deputize family even where
it does not ultimately counsel in favor a potential reform. The extent
to which patients may deputize family to authorize disclosure of
their Part 2-protected information is an example.
A patient’s ability to permit a loved one to do more than
receive protected information is very limited under both HIPAA and
Part 2. If a patient wants to permit a loved one to authorize disclosures
to third parties, she must give that loved one the power to make
health care decisions for her through at least a power of attorney or,
in the case of Part 2, formal guardianship. 154 No in-between option is
available whereby a loved one can be acknowledged and empowered
as a care partner, both receiving information and authorizing further
caregiver following discharge from a hospital, upon signed consent; hospitals
are obligated to provide all instructions to care to the caregiver in question);
Recognize, Assist, Include, Support and Engage Family Caregivers Act of
2017, Pub. L. No. 115−119, 132 Stat. 23 (2018) (establishing benefits for
home health caretakers who assist their family members outside of a hospital
setting” including a new position that coordinates with several agencies to
devise a specific plan to ensure the education and development of positive
outlooks for family caregivers); Mindy Fetterman, Family Caregivers Finally
Get a Break — and Some Coaching, NPR: Shots (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/04/27/606054065/familycaregivers-finally-get-a-break-and-some-coaching. The same considerations
that justify mandating attention to family caregivers in that context—at the
time of discharge, case-specific medical considerations may become relatively
less weighty and systemic questions about how entities beyond the provider
will care for the patient going forward become more weighty—may justify
requiring providers to inquire whether SUD patients would like to authorize
disclosures to their own care-givers, if any, and the provision of institutional
and educational resources to such caregivers, at the time of discharge from
inpatient or outpatient SUD treatment.
154 See Office for Civil Rights Headquarters, supra note 119 (“State or other law
should be consulted to determine the authority of the personal representative
to receive or access the individual’s protected health information.”); cf. Daniel
L. Walbright, Recent OCR Action Provides HIPAA Guidance Related to Opioid
Crisis and Privacy Rule in Research, Nat’l L. Rev. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.
natlawreview.com/article/recent-ocr-action-provides-hipaa-guidance-relatedto-opioid-crisis-and-privacy-rule (describing recent HHS OCR release of tools
designed to assist patients and family members in situations of opioid abuse
and overdose and mental health crises).
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disclosures to additional providers or care workers.
Supported decision-making is an alternative approach that has
been gaining ground in other contexts. It is a rights-based alternative
to guardianship in the disability and elder law fields.155 Supported
decision-making provides “legal recognition to relationships of
trust” by empowering a person’s “advocate” to discuss her health
care and other options with providers and otherwise participate in
the care decision-making process.156 The key insight of supported
decision-making is to create an interim legal recognition, short
of power of attorney or other forms of actual decision-making
control, for advocates who participate in a person’s health care.157
A number of states have passed legislation explicitly empowering
patients to acknowledge supported decisionmakers, ensuring that
such supporters be given enhanced participation in their loved ones’
medical decision-making.158
Such an in-between approach, in which patients could
empower their loved ones to participate in their care, including
receiving, sharing, and authorizing the disclosure of protected
health information, without giving their loved ones the power to
make health care decisions for them, holds promise for SUD. That
said, break-even analysis indicates that such a reform may not be
desirable and points to open questions that must be explored (or
about which informed judgments must be made) to decide that
question.
Health: From the perspective of patient health, supported
decision-making in SUD carries potential benefits and costs. One
benefit would be that such an approach would mitigate the difficulties
currently posed by care coordination in SUD; loved ones empowered
to authorize disclosures could help a diverse network of providers,
social workers, and others involved collaborate on a patient’s care.
On the other hand, empowering a third party to authorize
disclosures on a patient’s behalf creates an inevitable risk that such
155 See generally Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the
Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-making, 43 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 495 (2016).
156 Id. at 512, 516.
157 See id. at 514 (describing an interim legal recognition that uses the “best
interpretation of will and preferences” when making substituted decisions
on behalf of a person whose will and preferences cannot otherwise be
ascertained).
158 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 §9401A (2018) (“This chapter may be cited as
the ‘Supported Decision-Making Act.’”).
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disclosure will be undesired by the patient, and so of chilling the
patient from sharing information in the first place. As avoiding such
a chill is a purpose of Part 2, such a potential cost should be given
substantial weight.
Interference: The current all-or-nothing approach to
empowering third parties under Part 2 has clear downsides from
the perspective of interference. Some patients may feel compelled
to grant a loved one who is closely involved in their care power of
attorney to facilitate that involvement. On the other hand, other
patients may be forced to navigate aspects of treatment themselves
despite their desire to involve family because they are unwilling
to go so far as to give their loved one power of attorney (or enter
guardianship). In such a case, the current approach isolates patients
even when they have access to family supports who they would like
to make more involved.
Equality: Finally, it is possible that the current approach has
equality benefits in this limited sense: by effectively forbidding some
forms of care work, the current approach ensures that the burdens of
such work are equally distributed.
Implementing some form of supported decision-making
for personal information protected by Part 2 would carry potential
benefits: it could facilitate collaboration between providers and
others involved in a person’s treatment while both recognizing and
encouraging the close participation of loved ones in the treatment
of patients who want such support. On the other hand, such a
reform poses some risk of unwanted disclosures, and the burdens of
supported decision-making might not be unfairly distributed.
Having identified these tradeoffs, the next step in break-even
analysis is to construct upper or lower bounds for both (or either) the
uncertain costs and benefits of supported decision-making for SUD.
Effect on fatal overdose rates is a logical starting point for setting
these bounds. SUD sufferers enrolled in evidence-based treatment
have an all-cause mortality rate that is about 1/3 of those who are
not.159 So, it is fair to say that for each person who is chilled from
treatment, there will be 24.8 additional deaths per 1000 life years.160
159 See Sordo et al., supra note 16, at 4 (noting a mortality rate of 11.3 per 1000
person years for SUD sufferers in methadone treatment and 36.1 per 1000
person years for SUD sufferers not in methadone treatment).
160 This number subtracts the ineffective-treatment mortality rate from the outof-treatment rate from the prior footnote; 36.1-11.3=24.8, see Sordo et al.,
supra note 16, at 4.
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On the other hand, meta-analysis of studies exploring the relationship
between social relationships and health generally reveals a nondisease-specific 50% increased risk of survival associated with such
relationships, and studies on the SUD impacts of such relationships
are consistent with this finding.161 Based on this, we can estimate
a reasonable upper bound for the impact of family involvement in
SUD may be ~5.65 fewer deaths per 1000 life years.162 If we attribute
supported decision-making as capturing 10% of this by facilitating
more family involvement and coordination among providers, then
supported decision-making would mean .0565 (or .057) fewer fatal
overdoses per extra supported decision-making arrangement.
Setting bounds in this way reveals the following tradeoff: in
order to be worthwhile from the perspective of health, approximately
44 individuals would have to make use of supported decision-making
for every 1 individual who was deterred from seeking treatment due
to supported decision-making.163 This tradeoff makes it difficult to
say whether such a reform would be worthwhile or not from the
perspective of health; if the ratio were 1000:1 it might be easy to
say that supported decision-making is unlikely to be worth it, and if
the ratio were 1:1 it would be easy to say that it is. Thus, breakeven
analysis reveals that to be justified based on medical benefit alone a
reform applicable to patients who are in treatment must be strong
indeed if it comes with any increased risk of chilling patients from
seeking treatment in the first place, because the risk of chill applies
to all patients and the cost of such chill is very high.
Furthermore, this analysis reveals where additional
information or tough judgments are needed to decide about the
desirability of supported decision-making in SUD care. In the final
analysis, the desirability of supported decision-making in the SUD
context depends crucially on whether and to what degree such a
reform could lead to more patients being chilled from seeking
treatment for fear of unauthorized disclosures. This depends, in
turn, crucially on the mechanism by which some SUD sufferers’
fear of disclosure should they seek treatment comes to be. If this
fear is in some sense rational—based on the actual likelihood of
161 See Holt-Lunstad et al., supra note 5 (reporting 50% increased likelihood of
survival for those with stronger social relationships); supra note 50 (discussing
SUD-specific evidence).
162 This number multiplies the in-treatment mortality rate by .5; 11.3 * .5 = 5.65.
163 This number reflects the ratio of the bound for the potential health harm
(24.8) to the bound for the potential health benefit (.57); 24.8/.57 = 43.5.
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disclosure—then supported decision-making poses little risk of
chill. A SUD patient concerned about unauthorized disclosure
by her supported decisionmaker would have an option to avoid
such disclosure short of avoiding treatment altogether: she could
simply decline to empower such a decisionmaker (or revoke the
deputization). On the other hand, if the fear that chills patients
from seeking treatment—and that Part 2 is designed to mitigate—is
based purely on anecdotal stories of unwanted disclosures, then the
possibility of such disclosures resulting from a supported decisionmaking regime alone would give cause for concern. Further research
might helpfully explore this mechanism, and in the interim this is a
key question on which policymakers considering such a reform must
make a judgment.
5. Patient Deputies
The two preceding suggestions—active choice about patient
consent to disclosure of SUD information coupled with a new
option for patients to empower someone short of a guardian to
obtain and authorize disclosure of their medical information—could
be coupled at the state or federal level with a systematic “patient
deputy” program. A state or federal database (perhaps building on
prescription drug monitoring program infrastructure) could permit
patients to appoint a “patient deputy” who would presumptively be
empowered to obtain and share their health care information. Such
an approach would carry the potential benefits and potential costs
of the two separate choice architecture changes discussed above.
Publicity and centralization associated with such a program would
carry several additional positive implications.
From the standpoint of health, regulators could use
registration as a health care deputy as an opportunity to provide
educational materials tailored to help loved ones do their care work
more effectively. At the same time, such a program would be a
conduit through which to take steps to protect the health of such
care takers, who too often suffer their own health or financial issues
from their focus on their loved ones’ needs.164
From the standpoint of interference, state recognition of the
paramount but in some sense emergent, non-traditional role that
loved ones other than spouses play in many patients’ lives would
both encourage and provide recognition and validation to such
164 See Grunfeld et al., supra note 66.
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relationships.165 The state could use its expressive power to endorse
the role that so many already take on, thereby potentially facilitating
the formation of additional such relationships.
From the standpoint of invisibility, a centralized patient
deputy program would permit state regulators to begin to develop a
better-informed understanding of the extent of care work performed
by loved ones. Moreover, with this understanding in hand, regulators
could begin to address such work and relationships in social
programs that currently ignore them. For example, the Family and
Medical Leave Act currently excludes siblings from its protections;
a person is not entitled to protected time off to care for a sibling.
A patient deputy program would provide a ready basis on which to
expand these protections to all care takers, recognizing the evolving
nature of caring relationships today.166
Lastly, from the standpoint of inequality, a patient deputies
program would permit regulators to better track the benefits and
burdens of care work. Given a current scarcity of resources, it may
be too much to imagine that patient deputies would be properly
compensated for their labors, but observing labors that are currently
going un-recognized would be a first step. Moreover, as to burdens,
if such tracking revealed that that those able to make use of the
patient deputies program reflected an uneven sample of the overall
patient population, then regulators should explore directing available
resources—such as funding for navigator programs—to counteract
the imbalance in hopes of a more just health care system.
V. Conclusion: Deputizing Family in SUD and Beyond
While the health impacts of any legal intervention may be
165 Compare U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (endorsing
inclusive understanding of family in case involving participation of “‘hippies’
and ‘hippie communes’” in food stamp program), with Melissa Murray, The
Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers,
94 Va. L. Rev. 386, 398−99 (“The law effectively has constructed a
parent/stranger dichotomy in which one is either a parent . . . or one is a
legal stranger . . . .”).
166 Cf. Murray, supra note 165, at 388 (“By characterizing caregiving as the exclusive
province of parents, the law overlooks the considerable efforts of caregivers
who are not parents”); see id. (“[I]n order to better support caregiving as it
is practiced, I call for a broader legal understanding of caregiving that would
acknowledge a wider range of caregiving efforts . . . .”); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 576–84.
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paramount, when assessing the desirability of an intervention that
makes foreseeable use of loved ones such as family it is important
to consider the possibility that the health reform has adverse social
consequences. Even the mere possibility of such consequences may
turn the balance against adoption of a reform with questionable
health impacts.
Consideration of the social consequences of deputization in
the prevention and teatment of SUD—in particular, of interference,
invisibility, and inequality posed by laws that deputize family in
this context—counsels in favor of greater choice regarding such
deputization. The desirability of some changes, such as supported
decision-making or a patient deputy program, may be a matter
of judgment, but providers, insurers, and regulators should at
least favor an “active choice” approach when it comes to patients’
decisions to deputize their own family members in their care. In
health care and especially in the treatment of SUD, isolation should
not be the default.
There are also lessons that extend beyond SUD and beyond
healthcare. The “deputization” framework this Article has employed
offers a way of thinking about the burdens of care work generally
that makes such work more visible and more readily understood.
Scholars in family law have lamented that the public/private
narrative generally applied to care work—in which such work takes
place in the “private” sphere, as distinct from the “public” world
of regulation and government—facilitates the invisibility of care
work.167 Understanding all laws that foreseeably rely on care work
in addressing a regulatory problem as “deputizing family”—and so
understanding loved ones as analogous to social workers, doctors,
bureaucrats, or other regulatory tools rather than as sui generis,
independent, and invisible providers of care—breaks down this
public/private distinction.
This narrative shift may not be without cost—“deputization”
entails someone doing the deputizing, implying that the work is on
some level done for another. When deputization comes from the
state, “collapsing” the public and private actually means the public
absorbing the private. That understanding could interfere with family
relationships in unexpected and presumably (though perhaps not
167 Murray, supra note 165, at 436 (“Emphasizing the private character of
caregiving, they argued, absolved the state of any responsibility to assist
families in providing care, and, critically, contributed to the devaluation of
caregiving and caregivers.”).
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necessarily) undesirable ways. On the other hand, when deputization
comes through the patient—when a law permits a patient to
empower a loved one vis a vis disease or third parties—this risk
is not present. Relatedly, the examples and analyses in this Article
have revealed a similar tendency that separates laws that empower
a loved one vis a vis the patient and laws that permit the patient to
empower a loved one vis a vis third parties. Patient-disempowering
deputizations have tended to pose a risk of negative interference
with family relationships, while patient-empowering deputizations
have tended to raise the possibility of positive interference. That
dynamic is not unique to healthcare, so further research might
explore whether the character of deputization is as determinative of
its desirability in other contexts.

